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Peter Irons’ WAR POWERS favors congressional initiative in questions of war and
peace but makes a historical argument that our government has strayed from the
constitutional design in the service of an imperialist foreign policy. John Yoo’s THE
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE seeks to overthrow the traditional perspective on war
powers espoused by Irons in favor of executive initiative in war. Yoo also pursues a
revisionist perspective on the treaty power, which favors executive initiative in treaty
negotiation and interpretation but insists on congressional implementation so as to
minimize the impact of international obligations on domestic law. This Essay criticizes
Irons’ approach for its failure to provide a normative defense of congressional initiative
in war and takes issue with some of the historical and structural analyses underlying
Yoo’s defense of executive unilateralism in the realm of war powers. Because Yoo’s
arguments on the treaty power raise questions of methodological consistency, he is
susceptible to the criticism that his arguments are motivated more by prudential and
policy considerations than by fidelity to constitutional text, structure and history. The
Essay concludes that, while the constitutional text, structure and history are clear and
consistent and support Irons’ arguments fovoring congressional war powers, the
Constitution provides little guidance on how the treaty power should operate. Yoo’s view
that treaties do not bind the President finds no support in constitutional text or structure.
This Essay offers a structural interpretation of the constitutional treaty power different
from Yoo’s that would promote U.S. participation in multilateral treaty regimes that
foster security and the rule of law.
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Introduction
Just when it seemed that Congress and the federal judiciary were going to
let the executive branch have its way in the war on terror, the five-Justice majority
in the Hamdan1 case announced that it will scrutinize executive conduct in that
conflict for compliance with both congressionally-mandated and international
legal norms.2 The Court asserted its power to have some say in the debate over
foreign affairs powers. It remains to be seen just how active a role the courts will
play, thus reinvigorating a debate that was beginning to seem purely academic
over the proper allocation of such powers under the U.S. Constitution.

1

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
See id. at 2759 (“[W]e conclude that the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacks
power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the [Uniform Code of Military
Justice] and the Geneva Conventions.”).
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This Essay reviews two new books that take diametrically opposed
positions. Peter Irons favors congressional initiative in the realm of war powers,3
while John Yoo favors deference to the executive on foreign affairs.4 The
Hamdan decision is to be welcomed not because it resolves thorny questions
regarding the foreign affairs power but because it opens a debate that both Irons
and Yoo would like to foreclose. As Justice Breyer put it,
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with
Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not
weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the
contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to
determine – through democratic means – how best to do so.
The Constitution places its faith in those democratic means.
Our Court today simply does the same.5

While Yoo has argued that the judiciary’s role in foreign affairs should be very
small,6 Irons blames executive decision-making for substantive policy decisions
that he claims have “hijacked” the Constitution. This Essay argues, with Justice
Breyer, that the direction of our country’s foreign affairs must ultimately be
determined through democratic processes involving all three branches of the
federal government, participatory politics, and compliance with the United States’
obligations under international law.
John Yoo is a self-described “revisionist”7 legal scholar who, in a series of
controversial articles,8 and now in this book, has sought to challenge traditional
3

PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS, HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE CONSTITUTION
(2005) [hereinafter IRONS].
4
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER
9/11 (2005) [hereinafter YOO].
5
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
6
Yoo criticized the Hamdan decision in an editorial published just one day after the decision.
“What the justices did would have been unthinkable in prior military conflicts: Judicial
intervention in the decisions of the president and Congress on how best to wage war.” John Yoo,
Five Wrong Justices: Ruling Mistakes War for Familiarity of Nation’s Criminal Justice System,
USA TODAY 22A (June 30, 2006).
7
See YOO, at 7 (noting that his book “will be counted a contribution to the revisionist side,” and
naming Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Saikrishnah Prakash and Michael Ramsey among the
revisionists questioning the “dominant intellectual paradigm” on the foreign affairs power).
8
Many of Yoo’s arguments in the book were anticipated in earlier publications. See, e.g., John C
Yoo, War and Constitutional Text, 69 U CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text] (advocating a textualist approach to determining the allocation of
constitutional war powers); John C. Yoo, Law as Treaties? The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001) (advocating a structural
approach to explain the limited constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements); John C.
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scholarly views on the foreign affairs power – comprising the treaty power and
war powers. Yoo is an especially important figure because he not only has
advocated his positions in well-placed and influential scholarly articles but has
worked to put them into practice as legal advisor to the Justice Department during
the first term of President George W. Bush.9 Relying neither on the postratification statements of the Framers nor on court precedent, Yoo interprets the
constitutional text, structure, and pre-ratification history10 as supporting his
expansive views on the proper scope of executive foreign affairs powers.11 For
example, despite the Declare War clause,12 Yoo argues that the Constitution
actually empowers the Executive, not Congress, to take the initiative in

Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty
Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001) (defending the President’s authority unilaterally to
interpret, implement and abrogate treaties) [hereinafter Yoo, Politics as Law]; John C. Yoo,
Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1689 (2000)
(addressing the effects of multilateral defense treaties on the constitutional allocation of war
powers); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1169 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Clio at War] (criticizing the historical methodology
of legal scholars in the war powers debate and making a historical argument in favor of executive
war powers); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of
Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999)[hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking]; (arguing that treaties should be presumptively non-self-executing); John C. Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism] (same); John C. Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF.
L. REV. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Continuation of Politics] (arguing that the constitutional
design was for the political branches to share war powers, sometimes cooperatively and sometimes
antagonistically but that judicial supervision of war powers is both unworkable and undesirable).
9
According to the New York Times, despite the fact that he was only a mid-level advisor, because
of Yoo’s expertise in the area, he quickly established himself “as a critical player in the Bush
administration’s legal response to the terrorist threat, and an influential advocate for the expansive
claims of presidential authority that have been a hallmark of that response.” Tim Golden, A
Midlevel Aide Had a Big Role in Terror Policy, NY TIMES (Dec. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Golden,
Midlevel Aide], at A1. See also David Cole, What Bush Wants to Hear, 52 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS
#18, at 8, 8 (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Cole What Bush Wants], (“Yoo had a hand in virtually
every major legal decision involving the US response to the attacks of September 11.”)
10
See YOO, at 8 (“[T]his book concentrates less on judicial precedent and more on constitutional
text, structure and history.”).
11
See, e.g., Golden, Midlevel Aide, NY TIMES (Dec. 23, 2005), at A1 (stating that Yoo authored
legal opinions contending that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the war on terror,
“countenancing the use of highly coercive techniques on terror suspects,” and approving of
warrantless eavesdropping on international communications of Americans and others inside the
United States); Cole, What Bush Wants, 52 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS #18, at 8 (contending that Yoo’s
advice to the President was always the same: “the president can do whatever the president wants”).
12
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 cl 11.

[VOL. XX:XXX]

5
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

committing the United States to the use of force.13 With respect to the treaty
power, Yoo contends that the Constitution primarily empowers the President to
negotiate, to implement, to interpret and, if necessary, to abrogate treaties.14 He
denies treaty law any binding force as U.S. law unless implemented through the
exercise of congressional legislative powers.15
Peter Irons is a political scientist who has previously published a People’s
History of the Supreme Court.16 His frequent citations to that previous work and
to Howard Zinn’s People’s History of the United States17 telegraph the radical
political perspective that underlies Irons’ approach to the question of war
powers.18 Although Irons never directly addresses either the methodology or the
substantive arguments of Yoo and other revisionist scholars, he clearly believes
that the Constitution allocates war powers to Congress.19 He nevertheless
acknowledges that “the Constitution has not stood firm as a barrier against
presidential disregard of its command that only Congress has the power to declare
war.”20
Irons and Yoo have diametrically opposed views of the meaning of the
Constitution as to war powers, but that would only lead them to have opposed
views on the proper allocation of war powers if they were both convinced
13

See YOO, at 8 (“The president need not receive a declaration of war before engaging the U.S.
armed forces in hostilities.”); see also Yoo, Continuation of Politics, 84 CALIF. L. REV. at 170
(“[T]he Framers created a framework designed to encourage presidential initiative in war.”).
14
See YOO, at 8 (stating that the Constitution dictates that the President is empowered with the
“primary initiative to make, interpret, and terminate international agreements”); Yoo, Politics as
Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. at 870 (arguing that the executive has unilateral power to interpret the
domestic effect of treaty obligations).
15
See YOO, at 281 (arguing that, in order to maintain “the line between executive and legislative
power, and between treatymaking and lawmaking,” treaties must be presumptively non-selfexecuting and congressional-executive agreements must be permitted only in substantive legal
areas that implicate Congress’s enumerated powers).
16
PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1999)
17
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492 – PRESENT (New ed. 2003).
18
The minimal scholarly apparatus appended to Irons’ book likely does not do justice to Irons’
scholarly exertions. Nevertheless, the number of secondary sources to which he cites is strikingly
small and includes only Abraham Sofaer’s book (from 1976) representing the pro-executive side
of the war powers debate. Since Irons writes to address the current war on terror, it is also
noteworthy that the only post-9/11 secondary sources to which he cites are written by journalists,
Nat Hentoff and Bob Woodward. See IRONS, at 275-90.
19
See IRONS, at 3-4 (stating that the “Framers placed the war-declaring power solely in the hands
of Congress” while limiting the president’s authority to that of repelling attacks on American
territory or authorizing reprisals for attacks on U.S. citizens or property abroad or on the high
seas).
20
IRONS, at 243. Unlike Yoo’s book, Irons’ book focuses exclusively on war powers and does not
address the treaty power.
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constitutional originalists. However, neither Yoo nor Irons expresses any
commitment to originalism.21 Irons makes the traditional argument that the
Framers intended to entrust war powers to Congress, but he makes no normative
argument for why we should be bound to that allocation today. Yoo’s position is
more complicated. He rejects Irons’ “intentionalist” approach in favor of a
“textualist” approach that inquires into the original meaning of the constitutional
text as it would have been understood by informed readers at the time of its
ratification.22 Yoo argues that this textual approach supports “a flexible
decisionmaking system that can respond to changes in the international system
and in America’s national security posture.”23 On war powers, Yoo stresses that
the Constitution leaves the political branches of the federal government free to
work out the allocation of war powers as they wish.24 But where – as with
respect to aspects of the treaty power – the constitutional text does not support
such flexibility, Yoo cannot rely on an original understanding of the Constitution.
Rather, he makes prudential arguments, suggesting that his primary allegiance as
a scholar and as a political figure is not to textualist originalism.25
Part I of this Essay summarizes Irons’ traditional approach to war powers
– which focuses on the intentions of the Framers and post-ratification history –and
argues that his book fails to resolve the central tension it describes between the
constitutional allocation of war powers and recent practice, in which Presidents
make key decisions involving use of force. Part II reviews Yoo’s revisionist,
textualist approach to war powers and suggests that textualism need not lead to
results at odds with the traditional approach to the constitutional allocation of war
powers. Part III reviews Yoo’s arguments with respect to the treaty power and
contends that these arguments are linked less by their commitment to textualist
originalism than by their ingenuity in promoting executive primacy in foreign

21

Yoo provides an oddly diffident account of originalism, noting that some Supreme Court
Justices who support originalism while others favor a “living Constitution.” He also notes,
without taking sides, that academics differ over “how much deference to provide the Framers.”
YOO, at 25.
22
See id. at 28 (“It is the original understanding of the document held by its ratifiers that matters,
not the original intentions of its drafters.”).
23
See id. at x-xi.
24
See id. at 8 (“On the question of war, flexibility means there is no one constitutionally correct
method for waging war.”).
25
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT] (defining
prudential arguments as “advancing particular doctrines according to the practical wisdom of
using the courts in a particular way”). Bobbitt later notes, summarizing Justice Hugo Black’s
textualist attack on the prudential jurisprudence of Justice Felix Frankfurter, “[I]f a prudential
approach is used to decide between texts, then the texts themselves really count for nothing in the
decision.” Id. at 60.
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affairs and in promoting federalist and separation of powers principles over other
constitutional principles that would give treaty law binding force as U.S. law.
Finally, in Part IV, the Essay argues that the Constitution’s meaning
should not be left for the executive branch to determine. With respect to war
powers, this Part presents alternative “structural” interpretations of the
Constitution and argues that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution
undermine both Irons’ interpretation, which does not permit for the evolution of
constitutional doctrines relating to the allocation of war powers, and Yoo’s
interpretation, which presumes grants of executive power that are neither express
nor implied in the constitutional text. While Yoo’s structural interpretation with
respect to the Treaty Power focuses on separation of powers, Part IV explores
other structural elements to the Constitution, including limited government,
federalism, checks and balances, and a commitment to the efficacy of
international law.

I

Irons and the Traditional Perspective on War
Powers

What I will here call the “traditional perspective” on war powers was
formed in the decades following the Vietnam War, when scholars such as Louis
Fisher, Louis Henkin, Michael Glennon, Harold Koh and John Hart Ely26 all
published books contending that the constitutional allocation of war powers calls
for congressional involvement in decisions involving the use of force and judicial
review of decisions relating to war and peace.27 Although the sudden scholarly
26

See generally, LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2003; 1st ed. 1995) [hereinafter
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER]; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996; 1st ed. 1972) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; JOHN HART
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1993) [hereinafter ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY]; MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIPLOMACY (1990) [hereinafter GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY]; LOUIS HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990) [hereinafter HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM]; HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990)
[hereinafter KOH, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION]; FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B.
FIRMAGE, WITH FRANCIS P. BUTLER, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS
IN HISTORY AND LAW (1986) [hereinafter WORMUTH & FIRMAGE]; W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH?
(1981) [hereinafter REVELEY, WAR POWERS].
27

Yoo critiques the traditional approach as follows:
Conventional wisdom on the legal framework governing American
foreign relations has suffered from three significant flaws. First,
scholars have sought to impose a strict, legalistic process on the
interaction of the executive and legislative branches in reaching
decisions on war and peace. Second, they have claimed that the
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passion for congressional war powers was linked to the Vietnam War and the illfated War Powers Resolution,28 its proponents maintain that their views on war
powers were simply assumed to be correct until the Nuclear Age. As Louis
Fisher puts it,
With studied care and deliberation, the Framers of the
Constitution created a structure to prevent presidential wars.
. . . Making fundamental judgments about representative
government, popular control, and human nature, they placed
the power of war and peace with the legislative branch and
divided foreign policy between the President and Congress.
For the most part, the Framers’ model prevailed from 1789
to 1950.29

Support for the traditional perspective derives largely from three sources: the
constitutional text; statements by the Framers during the Constitutional
Convention, the ratification debates or the Early Republic; and statements by later
politicians, judges and scholars.30 In short, the traditional perspective argues that
the original intentions of the Framers, as reflected in the constitutional text,
legislative history and subsequent statements by the Framers and others, were that
Congress hold the power to place the country in a state of war.
Irons assumes that the traditional perspective on war powers is the only
reasonable one, and his book demonstrates the problems that arise under the
traditional approach. In Irons’ view, the greatest harm done to the United States
by the current war consists neither in the loss of human life nor in the economic
original understanding of the framing generation both dictates the
limitation of presidential power in foreign affairs and establishes a
broad power in the federal government to make and implement
international agreements and international law. Third, they rely on
judicial intervention to enforce this precise vision of the balance of
powers in foreign affairs, backed up as it is by the original
understanding.
YOO, at 293.
War Powers Resolution (Pub. L. No. 93-148), 87 Stat. 55, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541 et seq.
29
Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2000). As late as
1973, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee remarked in its report on the War Powers
Resolution, “The transfer from Congress to the executive of the actual power – as distinguished
from the constitutional authority – to initiate war has been one of the most remarkable
developments in the constitutional history of the United States.” SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, S. REP. NO. 220, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT].
30
For the most extended versions of this approach, see FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS;
WORMUTH & FIRMAGE; REVELEY, WAR POWERS.
28
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costs of war, but in the “gradual but increasing subversion of the U.S.
Constitution.”31 The subversion consists of presidential usurpation of the
congressional power to declare war.32 Irons points out, however, that Presidents
have not acted alone in such usurpation. Congress and the federal courts have
been willing accomplices, as have “generations of Americans” who have not
called upon their elected representatives to reclaim their constitutional war
powers.33
Because Irons takes no notice of recent challenges to his intentionalist
approach to divining the meaning of the constitution, he merely insists rather than
shows that those who think the Presidents have extensive war powers are wrong.34
However, the main weakness of Irons’ thesis is that his book presents a version of
U.S. history and foreign policy in which the political branches of the U.S.
government have consistently strayed from what he takes to be the constitutional
design in pursuit of what he describes as imperialist goals. While Irons sets out to
demonstrate that the imperial presidency hijacked the constitutional allocation of
war powers, what he in fact shows is that the political branches have acted
together to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and have not let the niceties of the
constitutional text, as he understands them, interfere with implementing their
policy goals. If Irons is correct that our constitutional history strays from the
Framers’ intentions regarding war powers, he needs to provide a normative
argument for why those intentions should guide us today.

A.

Irons’ Intentionalist Approach

One of the strengths of Irons’ book is that he economically sets out the
basics of the traditional perspective’s claim that the constitutional text itself,
especially when considered in light of the Constitution’s legislative history,
establishes the Framers’ intent to locate the vast majority of war powers in the
Congress.35 He recounts the familiar narrative of how the constitutional draft
language, which would have given Congress the power to “make” war, was
changed, substituting “declare” for make.36 Pierce Butler had proposed granting
the power to make war to the Executive. This proposal, tellingly, died for want of
31

IRONS, at 2
Id.
33
Id.
34
See, e.g., id. at 24 (criticizing U.S. presidents for relying on the Commander-in-Chief clause to
“claim for themselves war-making power the Framers specifically placed in the hands of
Congress.”); id. at 267-69 (arguing that disparities in funding, staffing and media coverage explain
why “Congress has virtually abdicated its constitutional war powers to the imperial presidency”).
35
See, e.g., FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS, at 12 (“Whether declared or undeclared, the
decision to initiate war was left to Congress.”).
36
IRONS, at 21.
32
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a second.37 Still, all agreed (and all still agree) that the President must have the
power to “repel sudden attacks.”38 Still, Irons argues, the Framers’ intent was that
“only Congress could authorize the deployment of forces outside the nation’s
territory in combat against foreign troops.”39
For Irons, the Framers’ intent to repose war powers in Congress is made
manifest when one considers not just the Declare War Clause but the totality of
war powers enumerated in Article I.40 In addition to granting Congress the power
to declare war, the Constitution also gives Congress the power to issue letters of
marque and reprisal and set rules concerning captures on land and water,41 to
“raise and support Armies;”42 to “provide and maintain a Navy;”43 to “make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;”44 to “provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;”45 and to “provide for organizing, arming and
disciplining, the Militia and for governing such Part of them as may be employed
in the Service of the United States.”46 Moreover, in case there were any doubt,
Congress also has the appropriations power,47 its power to tax is linked to its
obligation to “provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States,”48 and it has the power to make all “Laws necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution”49 any of the other enumerated powers. There is no other
area where the Framers made their intentions manifest through so many separate
constitutional provisions.
The President’s war powers derive from two textual sources: the
Commander-in-Chief power,50 and Article II’s Vesting Clause.51 The treaty
37

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 21.
39
Id.
40
See id. at 23 (“Read together, as the Framers clearly intended them to be, the five clauses in
Article I of the Constitution lodged the ultimate power over the nation’s armed forces in
Congress.”)
41
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 cl 11.
42
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
43
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
44
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
45
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
46
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
47
Id. art I, § 7, cl. 1.
48
Id. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
49
Id. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
50
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
51
Id. art. II, § 1.
38
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power and the Appointments Clause supplement these clauses to constitute a
considerable grant of foreign relations power to the President, but that power is
not generally viewed as granting war powers to the President.52 From the
traditional perspective, these provisions grant the President broad powers to
conduct foreign relations on behalf of the United States, but subject to the
limitations provided through the enumeration of congressional powers in Article
I.53
The traditional view that the Commander-in-Chief power is narrowly
circumscribed is buttressed by the constitutional text, which specifies that the
President “shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and the of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States . . . .”54 The Framers saw standing armies under the
control of a powerful executive as a threat to democracy and thus anticipated that
there would be no significant federal army.55 Alexander Hamilton, no enemy of
executive power, acknowledged that the President would exercise his
Commander-in-Chief power only “in the direction of war when authorized or
begun.”56 Moreover, as Irons indicates in the one area of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century history where he is more thorough than Yoo, the point of the
52

Neither the traditional perspective nor Yoo’s revisionist approach treat the treaty power or the
Appointments Clause as creating war powers. Indeed, Yoo reasons by analogy that the
Appointments Clause limits the President’s power to authorize U.S. military personnel to serve
under foreign command as part of multinational forces. YOO, at 176-81. See also FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS, at 12-13 (discussing only the Commander-in-Chief clause as a
source for executive war powers)
53
See IRONS, at 23 (arguing that executive war powers were limited to response to an “immediate
situation” and that Congress alone could grant the President authority to command troops).
54
U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
55
See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 120-21 (2003) (recounting antiFederalist opposition to standing armies and discussing Federalist plans for a peacetime force of
3000, including a corps of engineers); REVELEY, WAR POWERS, at 65 (characterizing the federalist
view as “there would be no armies, navies or militia for [the President] to lead unless Congress so
provided”); WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, at 110 (recounting Federalist responses to concerns about
executive abuse of the Commander-in-Chief power, which centered on Congress’s ability to check
that power through its power to raise fleets and armies); Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. at 1680 (“After the peace with Great Britain, the United States did not
immediately maintain a large peacetime army or navy and did not really do so until the Cold
War.”).
56
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, no 69, p. 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library, n.d.); see also
IRONS, at 26-27 (citing Iredell, Hamilton and Madison and concluding that “Madison’s emphatic
statement, and the entire record of the Constitutional Convention, leaves no doubt that the Framers
agreed that Congress, the body elected by the people, should hold the awesome power to commit
the nation to war”).
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Commander-in-Chief power traditionally was not to create executive war powers
but to subordinate the military to civil authority.57
That leaves Article II’s Vesting Clause as the most likely source for
significant war powers. As Yoo and others have pointed out,58 unlike Article I,
which vests in Congress only “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted,”59 Article II
simply states that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”60 Yoo takes this to signify that, while Congress’s
constitutional powers are limited to those enumerated in Article I, the President
has all powers associated with executive power at the time of the framing.61 The
traditional perspective rejects any claim of executive war powers based on the
Vesting Clause alone, which on its face seems to indicate only that the executive
power will be invested in one President rather than in a plural body, as it was, for
example, under the Articles of Confederation.62 The argument for executive war
powers based on the Vesting Clause rests on an interpretation of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century political theory, which in turn generates an interpretation of
the constitutional text. The text of the Constitution, standing alone, lends strong
support to the traditional perspective on war powers.63 As John Hart Ely has
pointed out, while the original intention of the Framers is often so obscure that we
are really left to our own devices, the Constitution is perfectly clear in the realm
of war powers.64
57

See Irons, at 24-25 (stating that it became a fundamental principle of the U.S. Constitution, as it
was the British Army, that military officers be placed under the command of a civilian); see also
WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, at 106-07 (providing a brief history of the office of commander-in-chief in
English and colonial history from 1639 through the American Revolution).
58
See YOO, at 18 (quoting Justice Scalia to the effect that Article II’s vesting clause “does not
mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power” is vested in the President)
(citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
59
U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, § 1.
60
U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. II, § 1.
61
See YOO, at 18 (“If we assume that the foreign affairs power is an executive one, Article II
effectively grants to the president any unenumerated power not given elsewhere to the other
branches.”).
62
See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs,
102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 554 (2004) [hereinafter Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism] (“The Article II Vesting Clause may simply make clear where the executive power
is being vested – in a unitary President – not the scope of that power.”).
63
See REVELEY, WAR POWERS, at 29 (“If we could find a man in the state of nature and have him
first scan the war-power provisions of the Constitution . . . he would marvel at how much
Presidents have spun out of so little. On its face, the text tilts decisively toward Congress.”).
64
See ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, at 2-3 (contending that the “original meaning” of the
Constitution is often “obscure to the point of inscrutability,” but that the Framers were clear in
vesting the power to declare war in Congress).
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B.

Irons’ Historical Approach

If the textual argument in favor of congressional control over war is not
convincing enough, Irons’ book also does an excellent job of setting out some of
the best evidence from the legislative history and from subsequent historical
glosses on the constitutional text to establish a strong foundation for the
traditional perspective on war powers. On the structural level, Irons points to
numerous writings by the Framers indicating their desire to have checks on
executive power and their fear of executive unilateralism – especially in the
domain of war powers.
After their experience with the English monarchy, the Framers sought to
prevent such powers from being vested solely in the executive.65 Upon hearing
Pierce Butler’s recommendation that the power to initiate war be vested in the
President, Elbridge Gerry remarked, “I never expected to hear in a republic a
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.” 66 Madison even
proposed prohibiting the President from having a role in negotiating peace
treaties.67 He feared that a President might try to impede the peace in order to
derive “power and importance from a state of war.”68
Later commentary by important Framers, both during the ratification
debates and during the Early Republic, was consistent with statements made at the
Constitutional Convention.69 As James Madison put it in a letter to Thomas
Jefferson, “The constitution supposes . . . that the Executive is the branch of
power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with
65

Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison, “[W]e have already given . . . one effectual check
to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the
Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.” 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd, ed. 1958).
66
IRONS, at 21, citing JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVETION OF 1787,
476 (Adrienne Koch, ed., 1966). Eight delegates to stated their opposition to giving the executive
the power to initiate war. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 64-66, 70, 292,
318, 319 (Max Farrand, ed., 1937) (recording statements of Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge,
James Wilson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry and George
Mason). Two other delegates, Oliver Ellsworth and Rufus King, strongly suggested that the
President should not have substantial war powers. Id. at 319.
67
2 FARRAND, at 540.
68
Id.
69
See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1603-09 (2002)
[hereinafter Ramsey, Textualism] (collecting quotations from Alexander Hamilton, James Iredell,
Charles Pinckney, James Madison, and James Wilson and reviewing the practice of the
Washington Presidency, all favoring congressional over executive war powers); Michael D.
Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV 1685, 1713-17 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, Text and History] (reviewing evidence from the
1790s in favor of an expansive reading of the Declare War Clause).
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studied care, vested the question of war in the Legislature.”70 Similarly, writing
as Helvidius in his exchange with Alexander Hamilton, Madison asserted that
“[i]n no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause
which confides the question of war and peace to the legislature, and not to the
executive department.”71 As Michael Ramsey put it, “Madison, Hamilton,
Jefferson, Wilson, Washington, Jay, Marshall, and an array of lesser figures
indicated that war power lay primarily with Congress, and no prominent figure
took the other side.”72
In the Early Republic, courts, to the extent that they weighed in on the
subject, generally supported the notion of congressional control over questions of
war and peace. In Bas v. Tingy, Justices Washington and Patterson analyzed the
state of affairs between the United States and France in terms of whether
congressional actions sufficed to establish a state of war between the two
nations.73 In Little v. Barreme, Justice Marshall, although originally inclined to
excuse Captain Little’s trespass against a Dutch vessel on the ground that Captain
Little’s conduct was authorized by President Adams, acquiesced in the views of
his brethren “that the instructions cannot . . . legalize an act which, without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass.”74 In short, the President could not
unilaterally authorize a military action, even a trifling one, that exceeded the
Congress’s authorization for the use of force. Justice Paterson, riding circuit in
New York, stated in United States v. Smith that the president does not possess the
power of making war because “[t]hat power is exclusively vested in Congress.”75
More significant, however, were the attitudes of the United States’ first
chief executives, as expressed during their presidencies. As early as 1793, when
70

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Apr. 2, 1798, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 312 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1900-1910). Madison’s expressed the same views during his
Helvidius/Pacificus exchange with Hamilton: “[T]he executive is the department of power most
distinguished by its propensity to war: hence it is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are
free, to disarm this propensity of its influence.” Madison, Helvidius No. 4 (Sept. 14,1793), in id.
at 174.
71
Quoted in IRONS, at 34.
72
Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1566.
73
IRONS, at 36-37; see 4 U.S. 37, 40-42 (1800) (Washington, J.) (discussing the possibilities of
“solemn” and “imperfect” war); 4 U.S. at 45 (Paterson, J) (noting that the U.S. and France were
engaged in imperfect war and asserting that “[a]s far as congress tolerated and authorized the war
on our part, so far may we proceed in hostile operations”).
74
IRONS, at 39. Marshall was never inclined to think that an executive order standing alone could
authorize seizure of a foreign vessel. Rather, he thought that such an order might support excuse
of damages. See 6 U.S. 170, 179 (1804) (“I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in
favour of the opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they
might yet excuse from damages.”).
75
IRONS, at 41 (citing United States v. Smith, 28 Fed. Cases 1192 (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1806)).
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the governor of Georgia asked President Washington to send United States troops
to intervene in border skirmishes between frontier settlers and Indians,
Washington declined, explaining that “no offensive expedition of importance”
could be taken without congressional authorization.76 Washington’s Secretary of
War warned territorial governors that military operations were confined to
defensive measures unless Congress decided otherwise,77 because Congress alone
was “vested with the powers of War”78 and Congress alone was “competent to
decide upon an offensive war . . . . ”79 Jefferson similarly explained to Congress
that an American navy captain had disabled a Tripolitan pirate ship but had
released the captured pirates because the navy was not authorized to take nondefensive measures without the sanction of Congress. In Jefferson’s view,
Congress alone could determine the scope of a conflict, and if only a ransom
should be demanded, Congress would set the amount. 80
John Yoo has argued that a declaration of war is merely an official
recognition that a state of war exists.81 The Declare War Clause thus is not a
grant of legislative power to the Congress but rather confers on Congress the
power to make a declaratory judgment, which gives it authority to pass legislation
appropriate for wartime.82 However, as Irons shows, in the Early Republic,
Presidents recognized that they needed a congressional declaration of war before
they could commence hostilities – or even before they could expand existing
hostilities. The Declare War Clause thus was not understood as a grant of judicial
power but as a grant of war powers. In June, 1812, Madison declared that a “state
of war” existed between the U.S. and Britain but presented Congress with “a
solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative
76

Letter from George Washington to William Moultrie of Aug. 28, 1793, in 33 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 72 (John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1939).
77
Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount of Oct. 9, 1792, in 4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF
THE UNITED STATES 195 (Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. 1936).
78
Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount of Nov. 26, 1792, in id. at 4: 221.
79
Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount of Mar. 23, 1795, in id. at 4: 389.
80
Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1801, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 326-27 (James D. Richardson, ed. 1900); see also IRONS, at 31
(quoting Jefferson as stating, “Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war,
tribute, and ransom as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce.”).
81
See Yoo, Continuation of Politics, 84 CAL. L. REV. at 207-08 (“[A declaration of war served the
purpose of notifying the enemy, allies, neutrals, and one’s own citizens of a change in the state of
relations between one nation and another. In none of these situations did a declaration of war
serve as a vehicle for domestically deciding on or authorizing a war.”).
82
See YOO, at 332, n. 14 (“[T]he Declare War Clause gives Congress the power to ‘declare’
whether a certain state of affairs legally constitutes a war, which then gives it the authority to enact
wartime regulations of individual persons and property both within and outside the United
States.”).
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department of the government.”83 The Senate at first refused to declare war and
wanted to limit the U.S. response to reprisal but approved the declaration of war a
few days later.84 The incident makes clear that Madison, acting as President,
believed that he needed congressional authorization before committing American
forces to war, even though he believed that a state of war already existed. Irons
shows that this perspective on war powers was generally shared by U.S.
Presidents. 85
But Irons also presents a counter-narrative that establishes a long tradition
of U.S. Presidents exercising unilateral non-defensive war powers. According to
Irons, Thomas Jefferson “first cracked open the door through which later
presidents barged with impunity.”86 In 1807, when a British vessel fired on the
American frigate Chesapeake, Jefferson responded while Congress was in recess.
Irons thinks the incident constituted a “compelling” crisis to which Jefferson had
to respond, but he also thinks later presidents have used the excuse of necessity to
justify executive unilateralism in much more questionable cases.87
In 1846, President Polk claimed that Mexico had invaded U.S. territory
and requested a declaration recognizing an existing state of war between the two
countries.88 Still, Polk recognized that a formal declaration was required, and
members of Congress at the time recognized that the President’s declaration of
war had no constitutional significance.89 But by mid-century, as Irons
acknowledges, the federal judiciary was increasingly deferential towards
executive authorizations of the use of force. 90 In the 20th century, Irons laments,

83

IRONS, at 47.
Id.
85
See, e.g., id. at 59-60 (quoting Lincoln to the effect that the authors of the Constitution had
placed war power in the hands of Congress because they “resolved to so frame the Constitution
that no one man should hold the power” of taking the nation into war); id. at 64 (quoting
Buchanan, who told Congress in 1858 that the President “cannot legitimately resort to force
without the direct authority of Congress, except in resisting and repelling hostile attacks”). See
also, REVELEY, WAR POWERS, at 277-85 (providing a “sampler” of executive statements
supporting congressional control over the powers of war and peace).
86
IRONS, at 42.
87
Id. at 42-43.
88
Id. at 57.
89
Id. (quoting Senator John Calhoun’s denunciation of Polk for announcing war when “there is no
war according to our sense of the Constitution”).
90
See id. at 63 (discussing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Durand v. Holland upholding the
decision of a naval commander to order the bombardment of a Nicaraguan port as part of
executive authority to protect lives and property of U.S. citizens); id. at 71-75 (discussing the Civil
War Prize Cases and siding with the four dissenters in accusing the Supreme Court of abdicating
its constitutional responsibility to say what the law is).
84
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U.S. Presidents have become far bolder in their assertions of unilateral authority
to use military force.91

C.

Conclusion: The Normative Limitations of
Originalism

Irons’ book offers two arguments: first, that Congress, the courts and U.S.
citizens have permitted Presidents to usurp war-making authority from the
Congress; and second, that Presidents have exercised their war powers
illegitimately, not only as a constitutional matter, but also geo-politically, to
pursue an imperialist foreign policy. Irons believes that the United States goes to
war far too readily and without much thought to the constitutional procedures that
ought to guide it.
However, Irons does not argue that congressional foreign policy objectives
were any less imperialist than those of the executive. Thus, the relation between
Irons’ title, War Powers, and his subtitle, How the Imperial Presidency Hijacked
the Constitution, is unclear.92 Moreover, even if we assume that Irons is correct
about the constitutional design with respect to war powers, he provides no
normative argument for why the Constitution must mean for us today what the
Framers intended it to mean. It is therefore hard to see why Irons’ narrative of
executive war powers is one of constitutional hijack rather than one of
constitutional development. In short, Irons’ book provides an argument that the
Constitution allocates war powers to Congress and a historical narrative that
demonstrates that our practice has strayed from the historical design. He does not
ponder the question of whether or to what extent the constitutional design should
matter.

91

See, e.g., id. at 108 (discussing Woodrow Wilson’s view that presidents have absolute control
over foreign affairs); id. at 129 (criticizing Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s commitment to lend
destroyers to the United Kingdom six months prior to congressional authorization of that deal
through the Lend-Lease Act); id. at 211 (noting that every President since Gerald Ford has claimed
“the ‘inherent’ right to initiate military action without prior congressional approval”).
92
Irons’ narrative of congressional and popular support for the United States’ expansive foreign
policy undercuts any possible claim that executive usurpation of congressional war powers is at
the root of American imperialism. See, e.g., id. at 47 (suggesting that the War of 1812, which
Madison’s critics dubbed “Mr. Madison’s war” was one that Madison himself has tried to avoid
and noting that “inflammatory newspaper reports” led the American public to issued “heated calls
for war”); id. at 89-90 (recounting President Cleveland’s refusal to lead a war against Spain
despite a congressional threat to declare war).
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II

John Yoo’s Textualist Innovation

Yoo’s work is indebted to an approach to originalism that can be found in
some recent scholarship on war powers,93 much of it inspired by Justice Scalia’s
approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation.94 These scholars argue
that the best way to get at the original meaning of the Constitution is to try to
understand what the constitutional text originally meant – that is, how that text
would have been understood by the eighteenth-century mind.95 The approach that
tries to get at original intentions, say the textualists, is anti-democratic. Since the
Constitution is an agreement that was ratified through representative processes, it
ought not to bind its ratifiers to intentions that are not manifest in the
constitutional text itself.96 Rather, the constitutional text should bind U.S. citizens
to what an ordinary reader at the time would likely have understood the text to
mean.97
One can – and others have – raised numerous objections to this approach
to both statutory and constitutional interpretation.98 With respect to war powers,
93

Recent scholarship exemplifying a textual approach to war powers includes an exchange
between Michael Ramsey and John Yoo: Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639; Yoo, War
and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639; and Ramsey, Text and History, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1685; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 101 YALE L. J. 231 (2001) [hereinafter Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power].
94
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 22
(1997) (“The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed . . . . I agree with [Justice
Holmes . . . .: ‘We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means.’”).
95
See YOO, at 107 (arguing for the controlling significance of the constitutional text in the
Ratification debates, since those who ratified the Constitution had only the constitutional text and
not the legislative history that was published later); Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at
1553-54 (“[M]odern theories of original understanding focus much less on a reconstructed or
subjective Framers’ intent and much more on the objective meaning of the constitutional text, as it
would have been understood at the time it was written.”); Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power,
111 YALE L. J. at 234, n. 1 (“[W]e think the best evidence of the meaning of a text is to see how
intelligent and engaged people at the time it was written commonly understood the words it
employs.”).
96
See YOO, at 27-28 (“[T]his book focuses on the Framers’ beliefs and actions in the ratification
process because the Constitution was the result of a democratic political process. Ratification by
popularly elected conventions gave the Constitution its political legitimacy.”)
97
See id. at 28 (“What those who ratified the Constitution believed the meaning of the text to
mean is therefore more important than the intentions of those who drafted it.”); Ramsey,
Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1555 (“[T]he inquiry is not what any individual member of the
constitutional generation intended, or even out best guess as to what that generation collectively
intended; it is, instead, the best reading of the text.”).
98
See, e.g., David Sosa, The Unintentional Fallacy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 919, 920 (1998) (arguing that
indeterminacy in statutory language undermines the textualist project and that the textualist project
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however, those criticisms seem beside the point. Whether one attempts to
establish the meaning of the Constitution through a reconstruction of the
intentions of the Framers or through an inquiry into the meaning of the
Constitutional text, one can arrive at the same results. While there might be areas
where the Framers’ intentions and textual meaning diverge, the war power is not
one.99 The traditional perspective is largely a product of the intentionalist
approach to constitutional interpretation,100 and it arrives at the conclusion that the
Declare War clause was intended to give Congress authority to commence
hostilities, whether by formal declaration or otherwise.101 Although Yoo
becomes even more suspect when refined to originalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s
Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L. REV. 529, 564-65 (1997) (defending a common-law
approach to constitutional law as embodying judicial modesty, allowing for flexibility and as
preferable to Scalia’s approach in terms of accommodating democratic ideals); George H. Taylor,
Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995) (developing a positive account of the
methodology of textualism – as opposed to viewing textualism simply as a critique of
intentionalism – but concluding that textualism does not succeed in limiting or eliminating judicial
discretion in statutory or constitutional interpretation); William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique
of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1173-86 (1992)
(rejecting Scalia’s argument that public respect for the courts is eroded when courts depart from
the textualist approach and inquire into legislative intent); William Eskridge, The New Textualism
37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671 (1990) (“It does not readily appear that the structure and ackground of
the Constitution support the new textualism over other theories of statutory interpretation.”).
99
It is also worth mentioning that, as the discussion to follow will indicate, the two approaches are
not as divergent as they may appear, since textualists rely on the same sources of information to
establish the most likely meaning of the constitutional text to the eighteenth-century mind as the
intentionalists rely on to establish the Framers’ intentions. See, e.g., Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. at 1569 (conceding that “views of the drafters and their contemporaries . . . are
nonetheless an important interpretive tool”).
100
Although the traditional perspective does pay careful attention to the constitutional text, the
bulk of the argument relies on extensive quotations from the Framers setting out their
understanding of the meaning of that text. See, e.g., FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS, at 3-14
(marshalling evidence from the annals of the Constitutional Convention, the Ratification Debates
and the correspondence of the Framers); ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, at 3-5 (same);
WORMUTH AND FIRMAGE at 17-19 (reviewing the legislative history and ratification debates
relating to the Declare War Clause); id. at 108-110 (reviewing the legislative history and
ratification debates relating to the Commander-in-Chief Clause). Reveley devotes a chapter to the
constitutional text. REVELEY, WAR POWERS, at 29-50. But he devotes three to a discussion of the
eighteenth-century background, the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates. Id. at
51-115.
101
Irons devotes his first chapter to the Constitutional Convention. IRONS, at 11-27. He does not
devote nearly as much space to the ratification debates and weighs the evidentiary value of
utterances in those debates no differently from later statements regarding the meaning of the
Constitution. See id. at 25 (“The debates in the convention, the later writings of delegates to that
meeting, and speeches in the state conventions that voted on ratification of the Constitution leave
no doubt that the president’s title and role as commander in chief gave him no powers that
congress could not define or limit.”).
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disagrees, a textualist account of the constitutional allocation of war can lead to
the same conclusion.102
If one is accustomed to the traditional approach to war powers, Yoo’s
approach can be disorienting. Rather than proceeding from a discussion of the
text to a discussion of what the Framers said about the text, Yoo begins with his
synopsis of the views of seventeenth- and eighteenth- century writers on the
appropriate allocation of war powers in a constitutional monarchy.103 There
follows a discussion of the practice of the colonies and the states during the socalled “Critical Period” before the ratification of the federal Constitution.104 Yoo
then asserts that the views of the actual authors of the constitution are not the best
guide to the meaning of the document.105 Rather what really matters, Yoo
argues, is what the ratifiers of the Constitution believed the Constitution meant –
insofar as we can tell.106 Having reviewed this historical material, Yoo concludes
that the Constitution, properly understood against the background of eighteenth-

102

See Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1609 (“[T]he best original meaning of the
Declare War Clause is that Congress (and not the President) has the power to place the nation in a
state of war through words (a formal proclamation) or action (authorizing an armed attack).”).
103
YOO, at 30-54.
104
YOO, at 55-87.
105
See YOO, at 107 (noting that Madison’s notes on the Constitutional Convention were not
available to the ratifiers, who could rely only on the text itself and on their knowledge of political
and constitutional history, and calling the ratification debates “perhaps the most important source
for understanding the Constitution”). Yoo’s position on the significance of the ratifications
debates is not unusual. The argument in favor of privileging the history of ratification over that of
the Philadelphia Convention goes back to James Madison, but has recently been revived by the
historian Jack Rackove and by legal scholars such as Charles Lofgren and Bruce Ackerman. See
Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding and Treaties
as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2126, n. 139, 140 [hereinafter Flaherty,
History Right?] (reviewing original and modern views on privileging ratification debates over
those at the Constitutional Convention).
106
Yoo acknowledges that there are difficulties associated with using the ratification debates as a
source for getting at the Constitution’s meaning, but he does not fully acknowledge the nature of
those difficulties. YOO, at 107. As one of Yoo’s critics points out, “we have records of only some
of these conventions, and the records that do exist are abysmal.” Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2162 (1999) [hereinafter Vazquez, Laughing at
Treaties]. See also, JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 16-17 (1996) [hereinafter RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS] (noting that “antifederalist commentary on the Constitution “echoed the hyperbole of eighteenth-century rhetoric,”
that the ratification debates were reported in a “spotty” manner, that the participants in such
debates were “obscure,” and concluding that the only understanding that we can be confident that
the ratifiers shared was a preference for the Constitution over the Articles of Confederation).
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century political theory,107 “does not establish a fixed process for foreign relations
decisionmaking”108 and thus “provides the branches with far more flexibility in
managing foreign relations than is commonly assumed.”109

A.

Political Theory and the Constitutional Text

In the war powers context, textualism arises as a critique of the traditional
perspective’s characterization of the constitution as riddled with lacunae on the
subject of the foreign affairs power.110 Textualism sets out to show that “there are
no gaps in the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers.”111 Textualism
can make this argument because part of its agenda has been an expansive reading
of executive authority, a reading that can fill any gaps in the constitutional
enumeration of the powers of the federal government by allocating such powers to
the executive.112 According to this textualist view, the Constitution enumerates
only the powers associated with executive power that were transferred to
Congress.113 According to Yoo and other textualists, the “lacunae” identified by
the traditional perspective reflect widely-held eighteenth-century assumptions that
the powers in question are executive in nature.

107

See id. at 8 (noting that the book “concentrates less on judicial precedent and more on
constitutional text, structure, and history” and begins “by telling the story of the place of foreign
affairs in the development of the American constitutional system during the late eighteenth
century”).
108
Id. at 7-8.
109
Id. at 8.
110
See, e.g., HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 14-15 (cataloguing the myriad foreign relations power
questions left unaddressed in the Constitution); REVELEY, WAR POWERS, at 31-49 (discussing the
Constitution’s “ill-defined, frequently competitive provisions” as well as “gaps in the war powers
provisions”). At times, Yoo seems to adopt the “gap theory,” at least with respect to the foreign
affairs power. See YOO, at 24 (“[T]he exact operation of important aspects of the foreign affairs
power was left undefined by the Constitution.”).
111
Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power, 111 YALE L. J. at 236.
112
See, e.g., YOO, at 30 (“Certain powers, such as the war and treaty powers, were understood [in
the eighteenth century] to rest with the executive branch.”); Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. at 1568 (summarizing the textualist position that “the President’s ‘executive power’
encompasses foreign affairs power not given to other branches by the text, and therefore includes
war powers other than the power to issue the formal declaration”); Prakash & Ramsey, Executive
Power, 111 YALE L. J. at 234 (“[T]he President enjoys a ‘residual’ foreign affairs power under
Article II, Section 1’s grant of ‘the executive Power.’”).
113
See YOO, at 18 (“These powers were specifically included in Article II, rather than subsumed
into the general Vesting Clause, because parts of these once plenary executive powers have been
transferred to other branches or have been altered by participation of the Senate.” ).
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1.

Political Theory and Practice

The scope of Yoo’s historical perspective on the framing of war powers is
impressive, encompassing “the British constitution in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, states constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation.”114
Yoo’s great innovation is to develop the argument that there was a consensus
among eighteenth-century politicians and political theorists about the proper
allocation of war powers between the executive and the legislature, a consensus
that he finds reflected in these diverse sources.
Both political theory, as primarily developed by thinkers
such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, and shared
Anglo-American constitutional history from the seventeenth
century to the time of the framing, established that foreign
affairs was the province of the executive branch of
government. Thus, when the Framers ratified the
Constitution, they would have understood that Article II,
Section 1 continued the Anglo-American constitutional
tradition of locating the foreign affairs power generally in
the executive branch.115

According to Yoo, while the Framers understood war and treaty powers to rest
with the executive, they followed the British model in giving the legislature
power over funding so as to check the executive. The management of foreign
relations thus was “dynamic,” based on the interaction between the political
branches.116
The Framers’ understanding of the dynamic relation between the political
branches would be supported, says Yoo, by the political theorists who were most
widely-read and influential at the time. Grotius and Vattel, for example, placed
the foreign relations power in the executive. They recognized that international
agreements that transfer sovereign powers may not be made unilaterally by the
executive but require approval of the legislature.117 Yoo discusses Locke’s notion
of executive prerogative, which would permit the executive to act “without the
prescription of law, and sometimes even against it”118 and implies that the
doctrine was incorporated sub silentio into the Constitution. Locke and
Montesquieu both believed that the executive exercised sole power over foreign
114

Id. at 27.
Id. at 19.
116
Id. at 30-31.
117
Id. at 34-36.
118
Id. at 37-38 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 160); see also id.
at 44 (discussing Blackstone’s version of the notion of executive prerogative).
115

[VOL. XX:XXX]

23
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

affairs – through what Locke called the “federative power.”119 While
Montesquieu recognized legislative checks on executive foreign affairs power –
through the power of the purse and through its power to disband the army –
neither Locke nor Montesquieu envisioned the judicial branch as having any role
in foreign affairs.120 Blackstone likewise considered “warmaking and
treatymaking powers as part of the royal prerogative,” while allowing for
legislative checks through the power of impeachment.121 Although the British
King seemed to have sovereign control over foreign affairs, during the eighteenth
century Parliament, through its power over domestic legislation and the power of
the purse, exerted “a more direct influence over foreign policy than the formal
allocation of constitutional powers would suggest.”122
This aspect of Yoo’s argument has been criticized in two ways. First,
some scholars simply dismiss the relevance of seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury political theory and the practice of the British monarchy on the ground
that “the framers consciously departed from so much of it.”123 It is safe to predict
that Irons would be in this camp, as he provides myriad quotations from the
Framers indicating their hostility to the notion of an executive empowered with
war powers akin to the “prerogative” of English kings. 124 As James Wilson put
it, “The prerogative of the British Monarchy” was not “a proper guide in defining
the executive powers. Some of the prerogatives were of a legislative nature.
Among others that of war and peace.” 125
Other scholars have objected to Yoo’s reading of the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century background as over-simplified and thus incorrect.126
119

Id. at 37-40.
Id. at 39-40.
121
Id. at 44.
122
Id. at 54 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
123
Cole, What Bush Wants, at 9; see also Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, 102
MICH. L. REV. at 572 (criticizing those who argue for expansive executive powers based on
Article II’s Vesting Clause as erring dramatically “in the presumption that America’s
constitutional practitioners mechanically applied European political and legal theory”).
124
See IRONS, at 20 (citing Charles Pickney’s concern that giving the President responsibility over
war and peace “would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective
one”); id. (citing John Rutledge’s opposition to “giving [the executive] the power of war and
peace”); id. (citing James Madison’s view that “[E]xecutive powers . . . do not include the rights
of war and peace . . . but should be confined and defined – if large we should have the evils of
elected Monarchies”).
125
Quoted in id. at 20.
126
See Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, 102 MICH. L. REV. at 572
(“[E]xecutive-power essentialists have painted too simplistic a picture of the relevant eighteenthcentury political, constitutional, and legal thought.”). More generally, see Mark Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L.
120
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According to these scholars, Yoo and other textualists have postulated a
consensus regarding notions of executive powers where none existed.127 Michael
Ramsey, Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty review seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury political theory and conclude that there was no consensus among such
theorists as to where the power to make war was to be vested.128 In addition,
Ramsey points out that the English constitution was not the only model that
influenced the Framers. The Roman Republic was also a significant model, and
under that system, at least in theory, the power to initiate war was vested in the
legislature.129
2.

State Constitutions, the Articles of Confederation and
the Ratification Debates

Yoo’s account of the significance of state constitutions during the
revolutionary period is heavily indebted to the work of Gordon Wood.130 Wood’s
argument, as summarized by Yoo, is that the American colonists were chastened
when their early experiments in increased democracy produced chaos “leading
some states to adopt admired constitutions that returned power to the executive
branch.”131 While Thomas Jefferson advocated reining in executive power in
state constitutions, John Adams’ approach prevailed. Yoo concludes:

REV. 781, 793 (1983) (“Where the interpretivist seeks clarity and definiteness, the historian finds
ambiguity.”).
127
See Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, 102 MICH. L. REV. at 559 (arguing that
neither the constitutional text nor historical evidence supports the theory that Article II’s vesting
clause can be read as a grant of plenary foreign affairs powers to the executive); Ramsey, Text and
History, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1701 (noting that the “currents of history do not all flow in one
direction”).
128
Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, 102 MICH. L. REV. at 560-71 (canvassing
the writings of John Locke, William Blackstone, Montesquieu, Thomas Rutherforth, Jean De
Lolme, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Hugo Grotius, and Emmerich De Vattel and finding no
consensus on which branch of government should wield foreign affairs powers); Ramsey, Text
and History, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1701-02 & n. 58 (arguing that Yoo constructs an argument of
historical inevitability based on selective emphasis and that none of the leading historians on
whom Yoo relies has endorsed his view of executive war powers).
129
See id. at 1700 (discussing John Adams’ writings on the Roman constitution).
130
See, e.g., YOO, at 29 (citing the work of Wood, Bernard Bailyn, Forresst McDonald and Jack
Rakove as sources for his understanding of the intellectual context of the Revolution); id. at 36
(following Wood’s and Bailyn’s views on the influence of Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone of
the revolutionary generation).
131
Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1648; see also YOO, at 63
(“[W]hen political and economic chaos beset the new states, these experiments in structural
dilution were rejected in favor of a unitary president who retained the executive’s original
powers.”).
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While the Revolution may have represented a rebellion
against the presence of the Crown, it was not an assault on
the traditional relationship between the executive and
legislature. As under the royal governors, the common
practice of the states either assumed that the governors had
broad warmaking authority, or explicitly gave them such
powers in terms reminiscent of the British constitution and
the colonial charters.132

South Carolina’s constitution, which imposed substantive limitations on executive
war powers, was an exception;133 but according to Yoo, this exception
“underscores the common presumption that such powers lay with the
executive.”134
Here, as in other contexts, Yoo argues by negative implication:135 “If the
Framers had wanted to prevent the president from commencing war without
congressional approval, . . . they would have adopted a provision not unlike South
Carolina’s.”136 But that argument is unconvincing, as one could also point to
express language granting state governors war powers which the Framers did not
incorporate into the Constitution.137 Nor did they adopt language from Article IX
132

YOO, at 65.
See id. at 72 (“[O]nly one [state], South Carolina, chose to impose substantive, rather than
structural limiations on the executive’s war powers.”).
134
Id. at 86.
135
See, e.g., id. at 148 (“If the Framers had intended to grant Congress the power to commence
military hostilities, they could easily have imported the phrase from the Articles of Confederation
into the Constitution, as they did with other, related powers.”); id. at 153 (“If the Framers had
sought to establish a system that requires ex ante congressional approval . . . Article II, Section 2
should have included an additional clause that the president ‘shall have Power, by and with the
advice and consent of Congress, to engage in War.’”). One reviewer of Yoo’s work has criticized
such arguments by negative implication as “‘when the dog doesn’t bark’ statements.” David J.
Bederman, Reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 490, 492 (2006) [hereinafter Bederman].
Bederman points out that Yoo ignores arguments by negative implication that would undercut his
position that treaties should be presumptively non-self-executing. Bederman concludes, “Yoo’s
dog is well trained; it barks only on his command.” Id.
136
Yoo, at 72.
137
New Hampshire’s 1784 constitution granted its executive the power “by himself or by any
chief commander, or other officer, or officers . . . to train instruct, exercise and govern the militia
and navy; and for the special defence and safety of this state to assemble in martial array, and put
in warlike posture, the inhabitants thereof, and to lead and conduct them, and with them to
encounter, expulse, repel, resist and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, within and
without the limits of this state; and also to kill, slay destroy, if necessary, and conquer by all fitting
ways, enterprize and means, all and every such person and persons as shall, at any time hereafter,
in a hostile manner, attempt or enterprise the destruction, invasion, detriment, or annoyance of this
state . . . .”). N. H. CONST. (1784), reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
133
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of the Articles of Confederation and grant the President “the sole and exclusive
right and power of determining on peace and war.”138
Moreover, Yoo’s argument that there was a “common presumption” that
war powers lay with the executive is undercut by his own narrative, which
indicates that the issue was a subject of considerable debate. That being the case,
one cannot blithely fill lacunae in the Constitution with a presumption in favor of
executive authority.139 In any case, Yoo fails to demonstrate that colonial charters
and state constitutions reflect in an intelligible way on the emerging sense among
the Framers of the proper allocation of war powers on the federal level. Yoo
provides no evidence that state constitutional experience played any determinative
role in the ratification debates over war powers. He gives no consideration to the
possibility that Anti-Federalist fear of a centralized federal government would
lead the Framers to constrain federal executive power – especially in the area of
war-making – in ways they did not think necessary with respect to state executive
power. In fact, the Framers freely and repeatedly expressed their desires to
minimize executive war powers.140
The historical record on the eighteenth-century view of executive power is
confused enough to permit differing conclusions. Martin Flaherty and Curtis
Bradley review the experience of the American states in the revolutionary and
critical periods.141 They find no evidence to support the thesis that people steeped
in political theory of the framing period would simply assume executive control
over the powers of war and peace.142 Rather, Flaherty and Bradley argue that
when some states moved
COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2463-64 (Frances N. Thorpe, ed., 1909, reprint
1993). Massachusetts’ 1780 constitution was nearly identical. 3 Id. at 1901.
138
ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX (1777). Yoo’s discussion of the Articles of Confederation is riddled
with baffling contradictions. The Articles pose a problem for Yoo, since under the Articles all
national powers were vested in the Continental Congress. Id. at 73. But one should not think of
the Continental Congress as a legislature, says Yoo; it was in fact the national government’s
executive branch. Id. at 74. “Legislative powers – even in the foreign affairs arena – remained
with the state assemblies.” Id. (emphasis added). On the same page, however, Yoo states that the
Articles “transferred all foreign affairs powers to the Continental Congress.” Id. (emphasis
added). On the next page, Yoo states that the Congress “exercised a mixture of judicial,
legislative and executive functions.” Id. at 75.
139
Yoo has argued that because Article II’s vesting clause is not limited in the way Article I’s
vesting clause is, “any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature, such as
the power to conduct military hostilities, must be resolved in favor of the executive branch.” Yoo,
War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1677. But no such resolution is possible if
the presumption in favor of executive war powers did not obtain in the eighteenth century.
140
See supra, notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
141
Flaherty & Bradley, Executive Power Essentialism, 102 MICH. L. REV. at 571-85.
142
Id. at 581 (noting that the pattern in state constitutions – “strong legislatures and limited and
defined executive powers – extended to foreign affairs”).
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“to enhance the independence and authority of the executive branch,” 143
they did so not because they thought that certain powers were inherently
executive in nature but for the pragmatic reason of providing a check on
the legislature. The actual allocation of executive power was, say Flaherty
and Bradley, “specific and functional, rather than categorical and
essentialist.”144
Yoo chastises John Hart Ely, Harold Koh and Jack Rakove for ignoring
the ratification debates.145 But Yoo’s use of these debates appears selective, and
the selection tendentious. Yoo contends that, since the ratifiers did not have
Madison’s notes on the Constitutional Convention, they had to rely on “the
background of the Anglo-American political and constitutional history of the
preceding century” which featured “not the enfeebled governors” of some early
state constitutions but “a rejuvenated presidency.”146 The result, Yoo claims, is a
Constitution in which
the president played the primary role in war and a significant, if
not primary role in determining peace. Customary executive
power over foreign affairs had returned to a unitary, energetic
executive, but one that took the form of a republican president
rather than a hereditary monarch.147

This argument is based in part on Yoo’s claim that Virginia was the “key state” in
the ratification process and thus that the debate there “powerfully suggests what
original meaning we should attach to the relative roles of the president, Senate,
and Congress in wielding the foreign affairs power.”148 As a political matter, it is
true that without ratification in Virginia, the constitutional enterprise would have
been shaky if not doomed.149 It is also the case that the Virginia debate featured
an extraordinary collection of both Federalists and Anti-Federalists and a rousing
debate on war powers. Still, given Yoo’s contractarian views on the significance

143

Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
145
YOO, at 106-07.
146
Id. at 107.
147
Id. at 107-08.
148
Id. at 140-41.
149
See id. at 131-32 (citing the views of Hamilton and Forrest McDonald on the importance of
ratification in Virginia.
144
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of the ratification debates,150 it is peculiar for him to argue that the tenth state to
ratify should have some decisive role in determining the meaning of the
Constitution. After all, the other participants in the ratification process were no
more privy to the Virginia ratification debates than they were to Madison’s notes
on the Constitutional Convention.
In any case, with respect to war powers, Yoo’s discussion of the debates
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists seems to miss the point. AntiFederalists criticized the draft Constitution on the ground that it gave too much
power to the executive.151 The Federalists’ response was not to defend the unitary
executive but to highlight the limits of executive power under the Constitution.152
Yoo contends that, in the war powers debate, the Federalists engaged in a
conscious strategy of exaggeration of the British King’s powers and intentional
distortion of Anti-Federalist arguments.153 However, as Jack Rakove has noted,
one can recognize the political and rhetorical context in which various statements
were made without dismissing “all statements on either side of the question as so
much propaganda.”154 The ratification debates strongly suggest that neither
Federalists nor Anti-Federalists favored an expansive executive.155 They differed
only in their estimation of how successfully the Constitution had fettered that
branch of the federal government.

B.

Yoo’s Textual Analysis

Because he thinks an expansive reading of Congress’s war powers is
inconsistent with the notion of executive power as understood in the eighteenth
150

See id. at 107 (arguing that the ratification debates “carried the greatest political legitimacy”
and forced Federalists to defend specific constitutional provisions and explain how they would
work).
151
See id. at 111 (“To Anti-Federalists, both president and king held the same powers over war
and peace, and thus threatened the same tyranny.”). An interesting, though different, take was that
of Patrick Henry in the “key” Virginia ratification debates. Henry criticized the Constitution on
the ground that it gave Congress all war powers. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAT STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, 172 (1836) (“The
Congress can both declare war and carry it on, and levy your money, as long as you have a shilling
to pay.”). Henry clearly did not share Yoo’s assumptions about war powers being inherently
executive in nature.
152
See id. at 122 (noting that Federalists in the New York ratification debate “stressed the
differences between the American and British plans of government,” contrasting the powers of the
king “and the relative weakness of the president”).
153
Id. at 122.
154
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, at 17.
155
See Ramsey, Text and History, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1712 (noting that when Anti-Federalists
complained about the scope of presidential authority, “Federalists responded by saying that the
President’s powers were not as great as the Anti-Federalists supposed.”).
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century, Yoo rejects the traditional perspective’s textual argument regarding
congressional war powers,. His textual argument has two components – an
expansive reading of Article II’s vesting clause and a narrow reading of Article
I’s enumeration of congressional war powers.
Yoo’s argument in favor of executive war powers is simple and
straightforward. Because the Constitution states that “executive power shall be
vested” in the President, the best way to understand the constitutional text is as a
grant of all executive powers, as those powers would have been understood in the
eighteenth century.156 Since Yoo argues that informed people at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification would have assumed that foreign affairs powers are
executive in nature, “Article II effectively grants to the president any
unenumerated foreign affairs powers not given elsewhere to other branches.”157
For the reasons given in Part II.A.1., supra, this Essay has argued that Yoo’s
reading of Article II’s Vesting Clause is unpersuasive.158 Yoo is at his most
brilliant in fashioning creative textual and structural arguments for a narrow
reading of congressional war powers. Here too, however, the arguments, while
interesting, are not convincing enough to overcome the clear statements of the
Framers and the practice of the Early Republic, both of which uniformly support
congressional primacy in decision-making processes relating to the advent of
hostilities.

156

YOO, at 18. See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926) (Taft, C.J.) ( “The
executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was
regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . . .”);
Alexander Hamilton, “Pacificus No. 1,” June 29, 1793, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett, et al. eds., 1961-1976) [hereinafter Hamilton, Pacificus]
(“The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is
vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in
the instrument.”). The difference between the Article I and Article II vesting clauses has recently
been called into question. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that the vesting clause of Article II
implicitly includes a “herein granted” provision similar to that of the vesting clause of Article I).
For an extended refutation of Lessig and Sunstein and a defense of the theory of a unitary
executive, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994).
157
Id.
158
In addition to the historical arguments of Bradley and Flaherty discussed supra, those opposing
the Vesting Clause Thesis have relied on Justice Jackson’s opinion in the Steel Seizure Cases: “It
is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add several specific items, including some
trifling ones.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also
Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, 102 MICH. L. REV. at 555 (2004) (“[T]he
Founders’ decision to list what they meant by ‘executive Power’ would tend to suggest, pursuant
to the expressio unius canon, that their list was complete, rather than merely illustrative.”).
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Yoo focuses his discussion of Article I on the Declare War Clause. He
has very little to say about Congress’s other enumerated powers.159 Relying on
Samuel Johnson’s English dictionary, Yoo concludes that the phrase “declare
war” connotes recognizing a state of affairs – “clarifying the legal status of the
nation’s relationship with another country – rather than authoriz[ing] the creation
of that state of affairs.”160 Yoo then professes puzzlement at the different
language used in Article I, Section 8, which grants Congress the power to
“Declare War,” and in Article I, Section 10, which states that the States may not
“engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay.”161 Yoo points out that the language in Section 10 creates
precisely the allocation of war powers between Congress and the states that the
traditional perspective would like to establish between Congress and the
President. This shows the difficulties of the traditional approach, says Yoo,
“because it requires us to believe that the Framers did not know how to express
themselves in one part of the Constitution but did in another part of the
Constitution on exactly the same subject.”162
There is a methodological difficulty here, because Yoo’s reading of the
Declare War clause treats it in isolation and thus ignores an important element of
the constitutional structure, which grants Congress numerous war powers.163 But
it is not really so hard to imagine why the Framers would prefer “declare” in Art.
I § 8 but “engage” in Art. I, § 10. The Constitution provides that the states have
no power to declare war but also that they may not engage in war, unless in
response to an invasion. Parallel construction could not have achieved the desired
effect here without significantly infringing on the President’s power to repel
sudden attacks that do not rise to the level of invasion.164
In addition, Yoo himself provides two strong arguments for the choice of
“declare” in Art. I, § 8. First, Yoo recognizes that “in times of declared war,
159

Yoo provides a brief discussion of letters of marque and reprisal and concludes that they refer
only to “one species of commercial warfare.” Id. at 147-48.
160
Id. at 145. Michael Ramsey reads Johnson’s dictionary as permitting a broader understanding
of “declare” to include “to make known” through action. See Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. at 1590-91(“Johnson’s definition is entirely consistent with ‘declaring’ by action as well as
by proclamation.”). David Cole points out that, even in the eighteenth-century, the phrase,
“Declare War,” was a legal term of art referring to both the commencement of hostilities and the
official recognition that a war was ongoing. Cole, What Bush Wants, 52 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS
#18, at 9.
161
YOO, at 146 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3).
162
YOO, at 146
163
See supra text accompanying notes 41-49.
164
See Ramsey, Text and History, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1706-07 (arguing that, because the
restrictions on the President’s war powers are not the same as the restrictions on states’ war
powers, the different language in the two clauses is perfectly reasonable).
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certain actions by the federal government would survive strict scrutiny but would
certainly fail if attempted in peacetime.”165 Thus, even if Congress’ power to
declare war does not constrain the executive’s powers as Commander-in-Chief, it
does constrain the President and hold him to his oath to defend the Constitution
and implement the laws of the United States. States have no such power and so
the word “declare” has no place in Art. I, § 10.
Second, Yoo’s discussion of the Declaration of Independence166 illustrates
how the efficacy of congressional declarations of war could go beyond mere
recognition of an existing state of war. The Declaration, Yoo tells us, did not
“‘authorize’ military resistance to Great Britain.”167 Rather, it “announced the
legal relationship between the mother country and its former colonies.”168 It is not
surprising that the Declaration did not create a state of war between Great Britain
its former colonies. Its purpose was to declare independence, not war. What is
noteworthy, is that Yoo recognizes that the effect of the Declaration was not
merely declaratory but transformative:
The Declaration’s importance was not in authorizing combat, but
in transforming the legal status of the hostilities between Great
Britain and her colonies from an insurrection to a war between
equals.169

As speech-act theory has long recognized, certain utterances are performative.170
Such utterances create states of affairs rather than reporting or commenting on
them.171 Thus Yoo recognizes that a congressional declaration of war could do
165

YOO, at 151. In the book, Yoo does not explain how a declaration of war permits Congress to
pass laws that it could not otherwise pass. In earlier work, he has cited the notorious Korematsu
decision as the sole support for his contention that “legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group may be justified by pressing public necessity.” Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1673, n. 102 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)) (internal quotations omitted); but see Ramsey, Text and History, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. at 1692-93 (“It may well be that the government’s constitutional powers are greater when
the nation is in a state of war than when it is not, but the augmentation turns upon the war itself,
not upon the proclamation.”).
166
YOO, at 149-50.
167
Id. at 149.
168
Id. at 150.
169
Id.
170
J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6 (2d ed., 1975).
171
Id. Austin provides some familiar examples: saying “I do” in the context of a marriage
ceremony; uttering the words “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” while smashing a bottle
against the stem; writing in a will “I give and bequeath my watch to my brother”; and saying “I bet
you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.” Id. at 5.
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more than merely grant official recognition to a pre-existing condition; it could
bring about a new state of affairs, one with both legal and political ramifications.
Just as scholars who have undertaken historical research with a
thoroughness that rivals Yoo’s have disputed the accuracy of his arguments
regarding eighteenth-century views of executive power,172 such scholars have
similarly disputed Yoo’s arguments regarding the meaning of the Declare War
clause. In a lengthy article, Michael Ramsey looks not only to Grotius, Vattel,
Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone, but also to Samuel Pufendorf, Matthew
Hale, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Thomas Rutherforth,
and Christian Wolff.173 Ramsey demonstrates that eighteenth-century theorists
used the phrase “declare war” to signify both a formal proclamation that
hostilities existed and the commencement of war through conduct.174
In a response to Ramsey’s article, Yoo takes Ramsey to task for discussing
political theorists whose influence on the Framers was negligible.175 Here, Yoo
seems to misunderstand his own textualist project. As Ramsey points out, his
argument that the evidence is conflicting regarding the eighteenth-century
understanding of the phrase “declare war” shifts the burden of proof to Yoo and
other textualists who claim that the phrase “declare war” could only be about
written declarations rather than declarations through action.176 The textual
advantage shifts to the argument in favor of congressional primacy in decisionmaking relating to war.
To argue, as Yoo does, that we should ignore theorists to whom the
Framers did not specifically cite in the ratification debates is to return to an
intentionalist approach and to reject the argument that the Constitution means
what an informed eighteenth-century reader would understand it to mean.
Ramsey’s approach is truer to the textualist project, but he concludes that the text

172

Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545.
Ramsey, Textualism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1570-95.
174
See id. at 1596 (“There would have been nothing remarkable in using ‘declare war’ to mean
initiation of a state of war by sovereign action, as well as proclamation.”). Yoo concedes that
“some eighteenth-century writers appeared to use the phrase ‘declare war’ to mean commence
war.”). Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1660.
175
See Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1645-46 (contending that the
views of political theorists whose ideas did not influence the framing generation are irrelevant).
Ramsey convincingly argues that Yoo is wrong about the influence of the writers in question and
shows that Yoo had in fact relied on the very same writers in some of his earlier work. Ramsey,
Text and History, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1690-91
176
See id. at 1686 (“By showing that the Declare War Clause standing alone is capable of a broad
meaning, and that the presidential side has no satisfactory structural account of that clause
[Textualism and War Powers] makes the arguments from ratification and post-ratification history
more decisive.”).
173
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itself does not support a narrow interpretation of the Declare War Clause177 and
that recourse to extrinsic material is therefore justified.178 Ramsey contends that
the extrinsic material fully supports the traditional perspective favoring
congressional war powers, and Yoo does not argue otherwise. 179
In terms of the range of historical sources that Yoo consults and the
sophistication with which he integrates primary and secondary historical source
materials, Yoo’s scholarship is an improvement over that of an earlier generation
of scholars. Yoo is very to point out the failings of other legal scholars’ use of
history.180 However, he acknowledges that scholars such as William Treanor and
Martin Flaherty, who “have brought more sophisticated historical methodology to
the study of foreign affairs questions,” nonetheless support the traditional
perspective.181 At the very least, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the
constitutional text, structure and history support the traditional view of war
powers. And where the text itself is not dispositive, legislative history and postratification practice provide significant evidence of the text’s original meaning.
That evidence overwhelmingly supports the traditional perspective on war
powers.

III

Yoo’s Revisionism and the Treaty Power

Unlike his arguments relating to war powers, Yoo’s analysis of the treaty
power does not always favor executive unilateralism. While Yoo strongly
177

Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1602 (“In sum, the narrow
meaning of declaring war does not procde as satisfactory an account of the text and structural role
of the Declare War Clause.”).
178
Id. at 1569 (“Where we, through our best efforts to reconstruct eighteenth-century meaning,
reach a result at odds with the consensus views of the Framers and other eighteenth-century
interpreters, it is particularly appropriate to doubt our construction.”).
179
Yoo concedes that “[p]ractice plays an important interpretive role for the question of the proper
allocation of war powers.” Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1664; see
also YOO, at 234 “While not as relevant as the records of the ratification debates – arguments and
events after 1788 cannot have influenced the minds of those who adopted the Constitution in 1787
– postratification evidence can show how the Constitution’s structures worked in practice.”
Significantly, while he provides a discussion of twentieth-century practice, which could not
possibly evidence the original meaning of the Constitution, Yoo does not incorporate a discussion
of arguments and practice in the Early Republic into his treatment of the question of the
constitutional allocation of war powers.
180
Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. at 1643-48 (criticizing Michael
Ramsey’s historical methodology in Textualism in War Powers); Yoo, Clio at War, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. at 1175-91 (criticizing John Hart Ely, Jane Stromseth and Jules Lobel for their use of “law
office history” in legal scholarship on war powers).
181
YOO, at 26.
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advocates executive power to implement, interpret and, if necessary, terminate
treaties, he insists upon a role for Congress in giving treaties domestic effect.
Yoo thus provides an elegant solution to the practical problems raised by our
constitutional separation of powers, which gives the President the power to bind
the United States through treaties but generally favors congressional control of
domestic legislation. Yoo has undertaken impressive research in an attempt to
reconcile constitutional design with constitutional practice in the realm of the
treaty power. It is not surprising that, in defending a view of the constitution that
accords with his policy preferences for a strong executive and against the binding
force of international law, Yoo cannot always provide convincing defenses of his
positions based on constitutional text, structure and history.

A.

Interactions of War Powers and the Treaty Power

Yoo repeatedly states that he relies on “constitutional text, structure and
history.”182 In fact, it is more accurate to say that he takes a historical approach to
understanding the structure of the Constitution with respect to war powers and a
structural approach to understanding the text of the Constitution with respect to
foreign affairs. History and text play a role in Yoo’s views on the treaty power,
because his reading of the Article II Vesting Clause underpins all of his
arguments.183 But the main focus here is on one structural element of the
Constitution – separation of powers. Yoo’s view is that the President has plenary
powers over foreign affairs while Congress has plenary powers over domestic
legislation. The President thus has the power to make, interpret, implement and
abrogate treaties. If Congress does not approve of the way the President exercises
those powers, it may use its appropriations or other legislative power to deny
executive decisions domestic effect.184
Yoo’s discussion of treaties begins with a transitional chapter that
addresses the question of whether international treaties can require the United
States either to commit its armed forces to hostilities or to refrain from the use of
force.185 On the first question, even some supporters of congressional war powers
have argued that the executive has the power under the U.N. Charter to commit
the United States to participation in multinational military operations authorized
182

YOO, at, e.g. viii, 5, 8.
See id. at 183-83 (“Article II’s Vesting Clause requires that we construe any ambiguities in the
allocation of executive power in favor of the president.”).

183

184

See YOO, at 293 (“[F]oreign policy emerges from the interaction of the plenary powers
of the different branches of government. Congress may set its powers over funding and
legislation against the president’s Article II authorities in war and treatymaking and his
structural advantages in wielding power, or the branches may choose to cooperate to
reach foreign policy outcomes.”).
185

See Yoo, at 143-81 (Chapter 5: “War Powers for a New World” ).
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under Chapter VII of the Charter.186 Yoo finds the argument irrelevant as, in his
view, the President would have such constitutional authority even if the U.N.
Charter did not exist.187 Moreover, based on the example of congressional
inaction in the face of the arguably illegal NATO intervention in Kosovo
authorized by President Clinton, Yoo contends that international law cannot
constrain the President in the exercise of his constitutional war powers.188
Yoo finds “more interesting and difficult” the question of whether
Congress is constitutionally obligated to support executive-authorized uses of
force backed by U.N. or NATO resolutions.189 He notes that Alexander Hamilton
favored the argument for binding Congress to implement U.S. treaty obligations
as required under the Supremacy Clause.190 Yoo rejects this view, however, as
“inconsistent with the balance struck by the Constitution between executive and
legislative powers.”191
In a final section of his chapter in the interaction of war powers and the
treaty power, Yoo recognizes one significant limitation on unilateral executive
war powers. Although he contends that Presidents may freely ignore treaty
obligations in pursuit of policy goals,192 in certain circumstances Presidents may
not, in pursuit of policy goals, abide by a treaty requiring the use of force.
Specifically, Yoo criticizes President Clinton’s willingness to commit American
troops to fight in Kosovo under the command of non-U.S. officers.193 Yoo makes

186

David Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The Revolutionary Transformation of War
Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491 (1999) (reading the ratification of the Charter as effecting an
informal amendment of the constitutional allocation of war powers); Thomas M. Franck and Faiza
Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War:“The Old Order Changeth,” 85 AM J. INT’L L. 63 (1991)
(arguing that the President has the power to commit the U.S. to participation in U.N.-authorized
police actions without congressional approval). These positions are criticized in D. A. Jeremy
Telman, A Truism that Isn’t True? The Tenth Amendment and Executive War Power, 51 CATH. U.
L. REV. 135, 169-78 (2001) [hereinafter Telman, Truism].
187
See YOO, at 165 (“Because the president already has the domestic constitutional authority to
initiate military hostilities without any authorizing legislation, he need not rely on treaty
obligations for legal justification.”).
188
See, e.g., id. at 171 (“In neither Kosovo nor Iraq did international law impose a restraint on
presidential action, nor were federal courts about to enforce treaty obligations so as to restrict the
commander-in-chief power.”), id. at 172 (“Kosovo provides a clear demonstration that presidents
are not constitutionally or legally bound by international law.”).
189
Id. at 165-66.
190
Id. at 166.
191
Id. at 166-67.
192
See supra note 188.
193
Id. at 173. Yoo calls Clinton’s willingness to do so “unprecedented.” Id. David Bederman has
shown that, even on Yoo’s evidence, it is not. Bederman, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. at 493-94 (noting
that Wilson placed American forces under French strategic command in World War I and that
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a very interesting textual argument, based on an analogy to the Supreme Court’s
Appointments Clause jurisprudence, which would seem to require that any
commander of U.S. troops must be approved through the constitutional
appointments process and be accountable to the Executive.194
Yoo’s close textual reading is persuasive. However, if his analogy to the
Appointments Clause is permitted, one wonders how U.S. good-faith participation
in any collective security regime would be possible. Yoo suggests that U.S.
soldiers and officers acting under foreign command must be free to disobey
orders.195 No military can operate under such conditions, as evidenced by the
punishments, including death, provided under the U.S.Code of Military Justice for
soldiers who disobey their officers.196 In any case, in the unlikely event that
executive authority were to be challenged in such a case, it is hard to see why a
court would insist on viewing the U.S. soldiers as serving under foreign command
rather than viewing them as seconded to a NATO or U.N. force, thus relieving the
President of any constitutional constraints on command.
With respect to other aspects of the interaction of treaty and war powers,
Yoo abandons close textual readings and relies on the loosest form of structural
argumentation. He insists, for example, that legislative power is the main
structural check on executive powers contemplated in the constitutional design.197
But numerous other structural arguments could find support in the text and history
of the Constitution. One could argue that in the context of the treaty power,
Congress’s check on executive power is provided through the requirement that the
Senate give its advice and consent. Once it has done so, Congress is bound to
authorize funding for the treaties that have become law of the land, and it has
consented to the participation of U.S. forces in military engagements authorized
under such treaties, even if American soldiers would thereby be placed under
foreign command.
Clearly, one concern here for Yoo is that the judiciary could become
involved in interpreting treaties and thus act as a check on executive foreign
affairs powers. Yoo thinks that such a check “would expand the federal
judiciary’s authority into areas where it has little competence, where the
contingents of the Continental Army were under French command during the American
Revolution).
194
YOO, at 176-77.
195
Id. at 180 (“American commanders at the policy and strategic levels may countermand any
order, and American commanders at the tactical level are responsible for deciding whether to
implement orders of non-U.S. commanders.”).
196
Id. at 336-37, n. 72 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-892).
197
Yoo, at 167 (arguing that the Framers believed that legislative power “would provide a crucial
political and constitutional check on executive power and policies” while treaty-making powers
were the executive’s alone.)

[VOL. XX:XXX]

37
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

Constitution does not textually call for its intervention, and where it risks defiance
by the political branches.”198 It is hard to reconcile this contention either with the
constitutional text, which expressly grants the federal judiciary power over all
cases arising under treaties,199 or with the practice in the Early Republic, in which
courts quite often interpreted treaties, usually in ways that undercut the
interpretations proffered by the government.200
Moreover, Yoo’s institutional competence argument is hard to square with
his political career. The arm of the Executive branch that is entrusted with
interpreting and implementing treaties is the Department of State. However,
when Yoo was in the Justice Department, he clashed with State Department
lawyers about the extent to which the Geneva Conventions would apply to the
war on terror.201 The Bush administration seems to have relied on the advice of
Yoo and others in the Justice Department, and not on the State Department, in
determining what forms of interrogation constitute torture under international
law.202 In the Hamdan case, the Supreme Court sided with the experts in the State
Department and ruled that the Geneva Conventions will apply to detainees at
Guantanamo Bay.203 When the substance of the now-notorious “torture memos”
were leaked to the press in January 2005, the Bush administration retreated from
its earlier position.204 These episodes hardly support Yoo’s thesis that the

198

Id. at 172.
U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, Cl. 1.
200
See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical
Perspective, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=889924 (last visited
July 25, 2006) [hereinafter Sloss, Judicial Deference) (finding that the government lost 14 of 19
federal cases decided between 1789 and 1838 in which treaty questions arose and concluding that
the judiciary’s lack of deference to executive interpretations of treaties was consistent with the
Framers’ views).
201
William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor to the Department of State under President George W. Bush
rejected Yoo’s arguments that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Afghanistan because
Afghanistan was a “failed state,” or because the President has the power under international law to
suspend the U.S.’s treaty commitments. See Unclassified Draft Memorandum of Jan. 11, 2002
from William H. Taft, IV to John C. Yoo, at 4-12 available at
http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/01TaftMemo.pdf (last visited July 25, 2006),
[hereinafter Taft Memo]
202
Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POLICY 455, 458 (2005)
203
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. at 2786 (ruling that military commissions lacked power to
proceed against petitioners, detainees at Guantanamo Bay, because the rules governing such
commissions violate the Geneva Conventions).
204
The Justice Department issued a new memo superceding its earlier memo and withdrawing its
statement that “only pain equivalent to such harm as serious physical injury or organ failure
constitutes torture.” John Yoo, Commentary: Behind the “Torture Memos,” UC BERKELEY POINT
199
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Executive Branch is best positioned to provide dispositive rulings interpreting
treaties.

B.

The Power to Interpret and Terminate Treaties

Yoo contends that the structure of the constitution suggests that the
President has power to interpret, implement and abrogate treaties.205 Because the
Constitution is silent on the subject,206 Yoo again argues by analogy to the
Appointments Clause. As courts have consistently held that the President has the
power to remove from office appointees who must be approved by the Senate, he
must similarly be empowered to implement, interpret and abrogate treaties that
were approved by the Senate, even if the Senate differs on the matter.207
Yoo’s contention that the executive has the primary role in implementing
treaties and thus engages on a daily basis in treaty interpretation seems beyond
dispute. The Restatement (3d) of Foreign Relations Law states that “The
President has authority to determine the interpretation of an international
agreement to be asserted by the United States in its relations with other states.”208
The issue is whether the President should act unfettered in the area of
interpretation, implementation and abrogation, and Yoo here overstates the case
for Presidential unilateralism.209 While Courts in recent years have tended to
defer to the authority of executive interpretations of treaties, that result is not
constitutionally mandated, as they did not do so in the Early Republic.210

OF VIEW (Jan. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/01/05.shtml (last visited July 11, 2005).
205
See YOO, at 182-214 (Chapter 6: Interpreting and Ending Treaties).
206
See YOO, at 182 (“[T]he constitutional text does not explicitly address a host of other questions,
such as those surrounding treaty interpretation and termination . . . .”).
207
Id. at 186.
208
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTIED STATES
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT], § 326(1).
209
See Taft Memo, at 9, n. 16 (calling Yoo’s view of executive authority in treaty matters
“somewhat overstated,” and noting that “neither the Congress nor the Supreme Court would agree
that the President has plenary power over the interpretation of treaties and international law.”).
Some treaties expressly permit unilateral denunciation, but the default rule is that absent such
express provision or clear evidence that the parties intended to permit unilateral denunciation,
unilateral denunciation or withdrawal from a treaty regime is a breach of international law.
VIENNA CONV. ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8 INT’L
LEGAL. MATERIALS 679 (1969) [hereinafter VIENNA CONV.], art. 56(1). Yoo does not distinguish
between withdrawals permitted by international law and withdrawals that would place the United
States in violation of international law.
210
Sloss, Judicial Deference, at 1-2 (noting that the Supreme Court has recently stated that
government agencies’ treaty interpretations will be given great weight but arguing that courts did
not defer to the executive in the first 50 years of U.S. constitutional development).
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Moreover, while Yoo treats Goldwater v. Carter211 as establishing “that any
presidential termination of a treaty would be unreviewable in the courts,”212 only
four Justices signed onto the opinion that took that position.213 Four Justices
rejected that position, and one Justice remained silent.214
Nonetheless, Yoo would give the President a gap-filling role in treaty
interpretation akin to the role of courts in interpreting statutes.215 But unlike
courts interpreting statutes, the Executive Branch need not concern itself with the
legislative history of the treaty it interprets.216 Legislative history should not
guide treaty interpretation, Yoo contends, because where treaties must be
approved by two-thirds of the Senate, the on-the-record comments of one Senator
are even less persuasive than in the case of statutes, which require only a majority
vote.217 This line of argument is extremely difficult to reconcile with Yoo’s
insistence, in the context of his arguments about war powers, that the Ratification
debates provide the most decisive evidence of the Constitution’s original
meaning.218
There are three major problems with Yoo’s argument on treaty
interpretation. First, Yoo’s Appointments Clause analogy fails because
appointments and treaties are fundamentally different. Under the Supremacy
211

444 U.S. 996 (1979).
YOO, at 190.
213
444 U.S. at 536 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
214
See id. at 534 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting
the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a
constitutional impasse); id. at 539 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (voting to “set the case for
oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it so obviously deserves”). Yoo’s
characterization of Brennan’s vote to affirm the D.C. Circuit court’s dismissal of the case is
misleading. Brennan would have dismissed on far narrower grounds than the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion indicated. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting the application of the political
question doctrine to the case but voting to affirm based on the President’s “power to recognize,
and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes”).
215
YOO, at 193. It is curious that Yoo gives no consideration to the role of international
adjudicatory bodies in interpreting treaties. Treaties routinely provide for dispute resolution
through neutral adjudicatory bodies. His claim that the U.S. Executive should have authority to
determine what a treaty means is akin to a rule that one party to a contract should have authority to
determine what the contract means.
216
Yoo argues against the authority of legislative history generally. See Yoo, at 196 (“[T]he use
of legislative history expands the judicial function beyond its proper boundaries.”).
217
Id.
218
Curiously, Yoo relies on legislative history to defend his arch-textualism: “Part of the reason
the Framers established the two-thirds supermajority requirement for treaties was to render treaties
difficult to make and to protect the interests of the states.” YOO, at 196.
212
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Clause, 219 a treaty, once enacted, is law, and under the Take Care Clause,220 the
President is bound to execute the laws. An appointment is not law and binds no
one, by operation of law. Yoo’s argument hinges on his belief that the President
is free to breach treaties as a matter of constitutional law, a position that is hard to
square with the Supremacy Clause and the Take Care Clause.
Second, despite those constitutional clauses, Yoo gives no consideration to
the internationally- and domestically-recognized mechanisms for treaty
interpretation that are inconsistent with his views. International law requires
giving effect to the intentions of the parties as embodied in the treaty’s text, read
in the context of the treaty’s legislative history, and with an eye to the treaty’s
object and purpose.221 Courts generally recognize this approach as part of U.S.
law.222
Finally, Yoo attempts to defend his call for executive unilateralism in
treaty interpretation with an appeal to democratic populism, calling the president
the “head of the most democratically accountable branch in the national
government” and maintaining that “the people can hold the president directly
accountable for his interpretation of a treaty.”223 First, it is certainly not the case
that the executive branch is more democratically accountable than the legislature.
Other than the President, no member of the executive branch is democratically
accountable at all.224 Moreover, even the President is not directly elected and also
is not generally subject to dismissal for one or even for a series of constitutional
missteps. In any case, when it suits his argument, Yoo argues that the House of

219

U.S. CONST., art. VI, ¶ 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be supreme Law of the Land . . . .”) (emphasis added).
220
Id. art. II, § 3 (requiring that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).
221
VIENNA CONV, arts. 31-32;
222
See RESTATEMENT, § 325, Comment a (noting that, while the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties has not come into force for the United States, “it represents generally accepted
principles and the United States has also appeared willing to accept them despite differences of
nuance and emphasis.”) See also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (considering legislative
history in interpreting the Warsaw Convention relating to air transportation).
223
YOO, at 198.
224
In another section of the book, Yoo indicates that the process of approving treaties and
international agreements could be made more democratic if Congress were bypassed entirely and
the President were permitted to make such agreements alone. In support of this argument, Yoo
contends that “the president . . . (aside from the vice president) is the one federal officer chosen
by the entire electorate.” Id. at 258. It is hard to imagine that, for example Dan Quayle, was
“chosen by the entire electorate” to serve as Vice President.
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Representatives is “the most directly democratic part of the government,”225 a
statement much more in keeping with the constitutional design.

C.

Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties

Yoo’s structural approach to constitutional interpretation, which focuses
on separations of foreign affairs powers and legislative powers, leads him to
conclude that treaties must be presumptively non-self-executing.226 Otherwise,
Yoo contends, legislative powers would be transferred to the executive and
“treatymakers can regulate any area that lies within Article I’s enumerated
powers.”227 Yoo here seeks to protect from executive encroachment not only
congressional legislative powers but also the federalist principle embodied in the
Tenth Amendment.228
Yoo’s separation of powers argument here seems weak. If Congress’s
appropriations power is sufficient to check executive war powers, why should a
structural interpretation of the Constitution not permit the same check on
executive treaty powers? Indeed, as Yoo acknowledges, Congress’s ability to
override a treaty through subsequent legislation is recognized under the “last-intime” doctrine.229 In any case, as Yoo knows from his own experience in the
Justice Department, whether or not the Framers envisioned a strict separation
225

Id. at 224. Elsewhere, Yoo calls the House “the most democratic body of government,” id. at
240, and calls Congress the “most popular branch of government.” Id. at 244. Later, he varies the
theme, calling Congress “the most democratic branches [sic]” and the House “the most popular
part of the government.” Id. at 257.
226
See id. at 217 (arguing that non-self-execution “harmonizes treaties with constitutional
structure and maintains the important distinction between foreign relations and domestic
lawmaking”); see generally id. at 215-49 (Chapter 7: Treaties and the Legislative Power).
227
Id. at 218. As David Bederman has pointed out, Yoo’s argument is rendered a bit confusing
because he does not distinguish between self-execution – that is, the notion that treaties
automatically become U.S. law without congressional implementation – and the question of
whether a treaty gives rise to a private right of action enforceable in court. Bederman, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. at 494. For example, Yoo argues that neither the Constitution nor statutes are selfexecuting because not all rights arising under a statute give rise to a private right of action. YOO,
at 226; see also id. at 229 (associating self-execution with court enforcement of treaties).
228
See YOO, at 221 (“Self-execution would also free treatymakers and their legislative power from
federalism limitations.”).
229
Id. at 225-26. One would expect Yoo to object to the last-in-time doctrine on the ground that it
permits Congress to control foreign affairs. The fact that Yoo objects to it only to the extent that it
permits a treaty to override a statute (id. at 226) suggests that his primary concern is not to defend
a structural understanding of the Constitution but to limit the impact of treaties as binding U.S.
law. Yoo goes so far as to state that Congress, “under the last-in-time rule, also has the power to
terminate treaties.” Id. at 209. This is incorrect. Congress can override a treaty as a matter of
domestic law, but as a matter of international law, Congress has no power to affect the United
States’ treaty obligations or to terminate those obligations.
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between executive and legislative power, the reality is that the Executive Branch
plays a central role in setting the legislative agenda and even in drafting
legislation.230 The strict separation between treaty powers and domestic
legislative powers that Yoo asserts is part of the constitutional structure is
nowhere to be found in constitutional practice.
Moreover, Yoo is in this case inattentive to relevant textual and historical
evidence that provides an alternative structural solution to the separation of
powers problem that he identifies. As Curtis Bradley and Martin Flaherty have
shown, the Constitution grants the Senate power not only to consent to treaties but
also to provide “advice” in relation to treaties.231 Early practice suggests that both
George Washington and the Senate believed that the Senate had constitutional
power to advise the President as part of the treatymaking process.232 Practice has
moved away from this original understanding of the Constitution, but Yoo might
explore reviving the practice in order to reconcile constitutional practice with text,
structure and history. Still, Yoo seems here to be taking his separation of powers
principles to extremes. By assuming that treaties are non-self-executing, Yoo
would rob the executive of its power to make binding federal law through the
treaty process.
Yoo’s federalism concerns are more interesting in this context. In
Missouri v. Holland,233 the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate
migratory birds through legislation passed pursuant to a bilateral treaty even if
Congress would have lacked the power to regulate absent a treaty.234 As Yoo
acknowledges, given the subsequent expansion of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers, “there can be little doubt that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act would be
230

See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 St. Louis U. L. J.
931, 983-1005 (1999) [hereinafter Fisher, Congressional Abdication] (chronicling presidential
control of the budget process since 1974). Yoo has argued that the Supreme Court read the
Congress’s post-9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (115 Stat. 224) too narrowly in
Hamdan. Yoo claims that he had a hand in drafting the legislation and that he wrote it to grant the
Executive as broad an authorization as possible. See Adam Liptak, The Court Enters the War,
Loudly, N. Y. TIMES at Section 4: 1, 5 (July 2, 2006) (quoting Yoo as saying, “I worked on the
authorization . . . . We wrote it as broadly as possible.”).
231
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President power to make treaties “with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate”). See Bradley & Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism, 102 MICH.
L. REV. at 631 (“[T]he Founders appear to have understood that the Senate would have an advice
role that went beyond a mere affirmative or negative vote.”).
232
Id. at 634 (“[B]oth the Senate the President understood that the Senate would consult with the
President and give the President advice before treaties were finalized.”).
233
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
234
Id. at 433 (“Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of
the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United
States.”).
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constitutional without the need of a treaty” today.235 Still Yoo thinks that the case
illustrates the “textual and structural difficulties created by the theory of selfexecution,” because it gives the federal government a way to legislate in areas in
which the Tenth Amendment would otherwise prevent such legislation.236
For Yoo, the solution is to treat treaties as non-self-executing, requiring
Congressional implementation.237 But since Missouri v. Holland involved a
challenge to implementing legislation, Yoo’s solution would not address the issue.
Rather, what Yoo must really want is a reversal of Holland and a rule that
Congress’s powers to implement treaties through legislation are coextensive with
the Article I, § 8 enumeration. Yoo presents good structural and practical
arguments for why Holland undermines federalism,238 but David Golove has
provided exhaustive historical and textual arguments supporting the decision,239 to
which Yoo offers no response. It is hard to see why structure should trump text
and history in this instance.
Indeed, Yoo’s arguments on the self-execution of treaties have been
criticized generally as being without support in the historical record.240 Jack
Rakove concludes that “the framers were virtually of one mind” in assuming that
the Supremacy Clause’s statement that treaties are “supreme Law” meant that
they were self-executing and enforceable in both state and federal courts.241 For
both Rakove and Yoo, this unity of mind among the Constitution’s drafters would
not be dispositive if the ratification debates indicated a different “original
understanding” of the Constitution. However, Martin Flaherty has carefully
scrutinized the ratification debates on this subject and concluded that “[i]f
235

YOO, at 223.
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 222-23 (arguing that the almost limitless power accorded to treaty-makers under Holland
is inconsistent with the principle that the federal government is one of limited powers).
239
David Golove, Treaty-making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1314 (2000) (defending the decision in
Missouri v. Holland and hailing it as “one of the cornerstones of the whole edifice of the
constitutional law of foreign affairs.”). But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1868 (2005) (criticizing Missouri v. Holland as wrongly decided and
arguing that Louis Henkin’s historical defense of Holland is based on a false premise).
240
See Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM L. REV. at 2161 (“There is not a shred of
evidence that anyone wanted to give the House the power to block compliance with treaties
already in force.”); Flaherty, History Right? 99 COLUM L. REV. at 2120-51 (reviewing the records
of the Constitutional Convention and the Ratification Debates and finding them to support the
notion that treaties were to be presumptively self-executing);
241
Jack Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1
PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 264 (1984). Yoo’s response to the argument based on the Supremacy
Clause is that it is a federalist clause that does not address separation of powers. YOO, at 230-32.
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anything, the debates demonstrate that the Antifederalists had put the nation on
notice about the consequence of self-executing treaties and that the requisite
majorities of We the People ratified the proposal anyway.”242

D.

Treaties and Other International Agreements

In his final chapter on the treaty power, Yoo argues against the
interchangeability of treaties and congressional-executive agreements and against
treaty exclusivity – that is, the notion that Article II’s Treaty Clause provides the
only lawful mechanism whereby the Untied States can enter into international
agreements.243 Instead, Yoo would require that the United States enter into
international agreements pursuant to Article II’s treaty provisions “for regulating
subjects that rest outside of Congress’s Article I powers” and “in areas that are the
subject of the concurrent powers of the executive and legislative branches.”244
But congressional-executive agreements are permissible “in areas such as
international trade and finance, where international agreement would require
[congressional] cooperation for implementation anyway.”245
Yoo maintains that there is no “convincing textual or structural support”
for treating congressional-executive agreements as interchangeable with Article II
treaties.246 He rejects the textual readings offered by Myres McDougal, Bruce
Ackerman and David Golove,247 as well as the judicial precedent-based
arguments of McDougal and others.248 Since he sees these arguments as flawed,
Yoo concludes that the real reason scholars support permitting the U.S. to enter
into congressional executive agreements is prudential.249 But the
“interchangeability” argument is unacceptable to Yoo because it distorts the
constitutional structure by weakening the “president’s formal foreign affairs
powers.”250 Indeed, Yoo’s arguments against interchangeability are powerful.
Full interchangeability would permit “Congress to pursue its own foreign policy”
242

Martin Flaherty, History Right? 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 2127.
YOO, at 250-92 (Chapter 8: Law as Treaties? Statutes as International Agreements).
244
Id. at 253.
245
Id. at 274.
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Id. at 253.
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Id. at 253-56.
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Id. at 256-57. Yoo also rejects Bruce Ackerman and David Golove’s argument that the
permissibility of congressional-executive is established through a constitutional transformation
that occurred as part of an informal amendment process associated with the New Deal. Id. at 26064).
249
Id. at 257 (“Congressional-executive agreements represented an effort to replace what was seen
as an outmoded method for dealing with international affairs with a more efficient, democratic
process.”).
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Id. at 270.
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and deprive Presidents of their power to terminate treaties unilaterally, unless we
want to allow an exception to the general rule that Presidents cannot override a
statute in cases where the statute in question is an international agreement.251
Moreover, if we accept the claim that the federal government can do more
pursuant to its treaty powers than Congress can do pursuant to the Article I
enumeration, interchangeability would permit Congress to expand its legislative
power in ways that would undermine both the separation of powers and
federalism.252
Yoo is far more sympathetic to arguments that the Article II treaty process
should be the exclusive means by which the United States enters into international
agreements.253 In his view, this “exclusivist” argument fails, however, because it
confuses U.S. sovereignty as a matter of international law with domestic
sovereignty. It would permit the federal government to bind state and local
governments through international agreements in a way that cannot be reconciled
with federalist principles.254 Thus, for example, when the U.S. agreed to certain
World Trade Organization provisions, it remained free to choose how and
whether to live up to the WTO’s requirements, and no WTO body could order one
of the states to abide by its regulations.255 Yoo is certainly correct about the
WTO, but it is hard to see how the point relates to treaty exclusivity.
While Yoo’s case against interchangeability is multivalent and consistent
with his structural approach, his argument against treaty exclusivity seems
undertheorized. Yoo is correct that if exclusivity were embraced, “about 90
percent of the international agreements made by the United States since World
War II would be invalid.”256 But such prudential arguments should count for little
if the object is to be true to constitutional text, structure and history. The
Constitution provides for a treaty process. It does not contemplate an alternative.
This is not to say that we should abandon congressional-executive agreements,
but only to point out that Yoo has not offered a satisfactory constitutional
argument against treaty exclusivity. In addition, given the focus on separation of
powers in Yoo’s structural approach, one would think he would be concerned
with sole executive agreements, which bypass entirely the constitutionally
ordained role of the Congress in treaty-making. But Yoo barely mentions sole
251
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executive agreements and relegates to a footnote discussion of Nixon’s use of
such an instrument to terminate the Vietnam War.257

E.

Conclusion: Balancing Executive Power and
International Law

The second half of Yoo’s book contains a series of arguments about the
treaty power, all of which purport to derive from his view that the constitutional
design calls for a strict separation between foreign affairs powers, which are
exercised by the President, and legislative powers, which belong to Congress.
Despite the Supremacy Clause and the Take Care Clause, Yoo does not seem to
recognize treaty law or international law as meaningful constraints on the
President. Thus Yoo believes that the President is free to implement, interpret
and terminate treaties in a manner consistent with the interests of the United
States as he perceives them.258 Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela has suggested that
what Yoo calls “revisionism” is more aptly described as a “nationalist school of
international law in the United States,”259 and a nationalist approach is very clear
in Yoo’s rejection, in the context of his discussion of the treaty power, of the
efficacy of international law.
Yoo promotes the notion that treaties be presumptively non-selfexecuting, lest the executive treaty power encroach on legislative powers in the
domestic arena. Congressional-executive agreements are permissible only in
those substantive areas within Congress’s Article I powers. In this way, Congress
will not be permitted to use the treaty power to encroach on the executive’s
foreign affairs power, nor will it be permitted to broaden the scope of its
legislative powers at the expense of the states and the people. At the same time,
the executive’s foreign affairs power will always be subject to a legislative check,
as congressional implementation will always be required, whether the United
States enters into an international agreement by treaty or by statute.260
This Part has argued that Yoo’s arguments on the treaty power, which are
generally inventive, sophisticated and well-researched and many of which are
persuasive, are nonetheless burdened with a methodological eclecticism that
renders suspect his commitment to developing an interpretation that is true to
constitutional text, structure and history. But one cannot simply conclude, as
257

YOO, at 285 & n. 58.
See YOO, at 187 (“Presidents cannot carry out the nation’s foreign policy without interpreting
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Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Cultural Relativism the American Way: The Nationalist School
of International Law in the United States, 5 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS (2005), available at
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some have, that Yoo’s aim is to expand executive power at all costs.261 Yoo is
genuinely concerned that the federal government’s treaty-making power be
constrained and answerable to the political institutions most directly accountable
to the American people.
While Yoo is committed to an expansive view of executive power, a view
that permits the President to act aggressively in pursuit of the national interest, he
also warns against permitting any branch of the federal government to be
empowered to bind the United States to abide by international law.262 Yoo would
not subordinate national security to the United States’ commitments under the
U.N. Charter to refrain from the unauthorized use of force,263 nor would he permit
the United States to commit its Armed Forces to an international engagement
because the U.N. Security Council authorizes the use of force.264 Yoo is also
apprehensive that the U.S. might have to abide by adverse decisions of
international courts265 and that American citizens might be subjected “to
261

See Cole, What Bush Wants, 52 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS #18, at 8 (contending that Yoo’s
argumentation would support the legality of a presidential resort to genocide).
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See YOO, at 172 (treating the Kosovo intervention as evidence in support of his view that
Presidents are not bound by international law); id. at 209 (contending that Congress has the power
to terminate treaties).
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See id. at 245 (“[Self-execution of treaties] renders any presidential use of force that is not
taken in self-defense or authorized by the Security Council not only illegal, but unconstitutional”)
and id. (“In using force against Kosovo, the United States violated the U.N. Charter and President
Clinton, under a self-execution theory, failed to perform his constitutional duty to enforce the laws
of the land.”).
264
See YOO, at 246 (noting that “many scholars believe . . . that if the Security Council authorizes
war – as it did in the 1991 Persian Gulf War – the United States must use force to meet the goals
set out by the Council.”) This is a strange claim. First, a Security Council Resolution authorizing
the use of force (not “war”) does not obligate any member state to actually use force. Second,
since such a Resolution cannot pass over U.S. opposition, the U.S. would never be called upon to
join in U.N. authorized military action against its will, unless one believes , and Yoo does not, that
the U.S. executive lacks the power to embroil the U.S. Armed Forces in conflict.
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See YOO, at 248 (“Presidents are not about to issue unilateral orders to state prisons halting the
executions of foreign nationals duly convicted of capital murder.”). It is open to question whether
the foreign nationals at issue here were “duly convicted,” since the U.S. does not dispute that they
were not accorded their consular rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America) (ICJ 2004), at 42-43, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last visited July 27, 2006) (finding that the United
States breached its obligations under Article 36 of the Geneva Convention on Consular Relations
to inform detained Mexican nationals of their consular visitation rights); George W. Bush
Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005) (stating that the United States would
comply with the Avena decision “by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance
with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision.”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html
(last visited July 27, 2006).
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international rules and organizations.”266 When Yoo’s arguments relating to
treaties reflect a policy bias, it is a bias not in favor of executive power but against
international law.

IV

The Foreign Affairs Constitution After 9/11

Although both books under review in this Essay suggest that 9/11 and the
war on terror have had an impact on the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs
powers, neither book specifies what that impact ought to be.267 Yoo comes the
closest, in arguing that the flexibility built into the Constitution permits unilateral
executive acts of war in response to the novel threats of the post-9/11 world.268
But Yoo formulated many of the arguments in his book in essays published before
9/11, so it is hard for him to claim that either 9/11 or the war on terror justify
novel approaches to the constitutional design. The threats to national security
posed by terrorist organizations, while certainly significant, pale in comparison to
the national security threats that the United States faced during the Cold War, or
even to the threats that the young Republic faced when it was a fledgling state
confronting eighteenth- and nineteenth-century superpowers. The fact that the
enemies in the war on terror are often non-state actors also does not present novel
legal issues, as the U.S. faced threats from non-state actors, in the form of Indian
tribes and the Barbary pirates, at the time of the founding and in the Early
Republic.
If the post-9/11 world does pose new challenges in the realm of the
constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers, it is not because of 9/11 but
because of the rise of international organizations, including the United Nations
and other collective security organizations. The problem with Irons’ approach is
that it would freeze the constitutional allocation of war powers, even if our current
practice ignores that allocation, without providing a normative argument for why
we should today remain bound by an eighteenth-century model. From a
methodological perspective, Yoo’s approach is clearly preferable, and this brief
concluding Part suggests how one might follow Yoo’s methodology to different
conclusions about the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers.
In Part A, below, this Essay lays out alternative structural readings of the
Constitution that would produce different results. In Part B, below, this Essay
266

Id. at 267.
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provides a prudential argument for a new understanding of the constitutional
allocation of war powers that moves beyond both Irons’ traditionalism and Yoo’s
revisionist nationalism.

A.

An Alternative Structural Approach to the Foreign
Affairs Power

A structural approach to the Constitution builds arguments based on
inferences from the fundamental principles underlying the Constitution as well as
from the relationships among those principles.269 Structural arguments are thus at
least one and possibly two steps removed from textual arguments.270 They
require no specific textual hook; rather, they are persuasive to the extent that the
interpreter can convince us both of the importance of the structural principles at
issue and that their interactions within the constitutional edifice have been
properly specified. In short, a structural approach takes a holistic view of the
constitution, envisioning “the document as a unified whole and its various
provisions and clauses as mutually reinforcing”271 and attending “to the overall
design of the Constitution and the mutually conditioning relationships among its
provisions.”272 Advocates of structural approaches to the Constitution argue that
our textual approach to constitutional adjudication forces courts to bind
themselves to “the stated intent, however nonsensical, of somebody else.”273 For
better or worse, structural approaches permit much more creativity in
constitutional interpretation, as one can always stress one structural element over
others in order to reach a desired result. What follows is a small exercise in the
art – not science – of structural interpretation designed not to displace Yoo’s
approach but to suggest how it might be supplemented.
Yoo’s structural approach emphasizes separation of powers, at times at the
expense of other structural elements and even at the expense of express language
that undercuts his view of constitutional structure. Preservation of individual
rights figures not at all in his approach to executive power, nor does his
269

See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, at 74 (“Structural arguments are inferences from the
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1333, 1349 (1998
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discussion of war powers ever acknowledge the principle of limited government
as a significant element of the Constitution’s structure. His approach is thus
inconsistent, as principles of federalism and of limited government figure
prominently (and appropriately) in his discussion of the treaty power.274 Much of
Yoo’s approach to the foreign affairs power hinges on the thesis that Article II’s
Vesting Clause functions as a general grant of foreign affairs power to the
President, subject only to the limitations enumerated in the Constitution. Yoo
does not consider how the principles of limited government and federalism
embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments impact upon this Vesting Clause
thesis.275
Irons’ approach to the constitutional allocation of war powers assumes
congressional control and judicial oversight. But recent scholarship has suggested
that a large role for the judiciary in deciding vital matters of war and peace would
not have accorded with the Framers’ conviction that sovereignty ultimately
resides with the people and their representatives.276 Although Yoo does not
invoke this scholarship, it is supportive of the part of his attack on the traditional
perspective of war powers that would not hold the executive accountable through
judicial mechanisms. Still, Yoo could not wholeheartedly embrace the
perspective of popular constitutionalism because its main structural focus is on
popular sovereignty as the ultimate check on the federal government. The
popular constitutionalists thus view the Framers as having embraced a robust
form of participatory democracy that could fetter unilateral executive action.277
274

See supra, text accompanying notes 233-238.
See Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Modalities of the Ninth Amendment: Ways of Thinking about
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federal power”); Telman, Truism, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. at 184-88 (arguing that the notion of
inherent executive authority is inconsistent with the principle of limited government embodied in
the Tenth Amendment).
276
See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES] (“Final interpretive
authority [of the Constitution] rested with ‘the people themselves,’ and courts no less than elected
representatives were subordinate to their judgments.”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS x (1999) (developing a populist theory of constitutional
law in which “constitutional interpretation done by the courts has no special normative weight
deriving from the fact that it is done by the courts”).
277
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Finally, neither Yoo nor Irons provides a satisfactory account of the
interaction between international law and domestic law or of the Framers’ views
on the extent to which international law, or the law of nations, is incorporated into
U.S. law. The Supreme Court’s recourse to international and foreign law in
determining “society’s evolving standards of decency” under the Eighth
Amendment in Roper v. Simmons278 has revived academic interest in this issue.279
Recent scholarship suggests that the Framers fully expected international law to
be binding law enforceable through U.S. courts.280 International law could thus
be another structural element to consider in interpreting the Constitution’s foreign
affairs powers provisions. Alternatively, from a non-originalist perspective,
developments in international law – and especially in collective security since
World War II – provide grounds for argument that the constitutional allocation of
war powers should be set aside in favor of the modern law of multinational
cooperation and collective security.281

B.

The Foreign Affairs Power in an Age of
Multilateralism

Because this Essay has rejected the Vesting Clause thesis, it concludes that
the constitutional text, structure and pre-1950 history overwhelmingly support the
traditional perspective, favoring congressional involvement in decision-making
processes relating to war. But the fact that Irons has the stronger argument on
278

543 U.S. 551, 575-578 (2005)
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constitutional interpretation does not put him in a celebratory mood, because there
is no question that the constitutional allocation of war powers has been
disregarded in the nuclear age. During the Cold War, Congress acquiesced in
executive unilateralism in response to “three decades of almost uninterrupted
crisis in foreign policy”282 and the sense that, given the nuclear threat, the
President needed the capacity for immediate and decisive response to perceived
national security threats. Such congressional acquiescence in executive
unilateralism is no longer appropriate.
Irons’ book sets out to demonstrate the dangers of executive unilateralism,
which he links to the United States’ imperialist foreign policy. However, his
book actually demonstrates that the political branches have largely worked in
harmony in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Where Congress supports executive
unilateralism283 but the United States’ treaty obligations demand cooperation,
national unilateralism poses larger constitutional problems than does executive
unilateralism. The United States committed itself in 1945 to a collective security
system that prohibits unilateral use of force other than in self-defense.284 The
Cold War did not permit that system to operate as it was designed,285 but the end
of the bipolar world offered an opportunity to revive a collective security system
of which the United States was the chief architect.286 That opportunity is slipping
away but is not yet lost. In order to be true to the design of both the Constitution
and Charter, the President should work with Congress to realize U.S. treaty
obligations relating to peace and security.
Yoo’s view that treaties do not bind the President finds no support in
constitutional text or structure. Yoo and the revisionsists would have us favor
domestic policy ends over international law and treaty obligations in every
instance.287 That is contrary both to the understandings of the Framers and to our
282
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constitutional history, which has long recognized that international law is part of
our law.288 A President acts in bad faith –with respect both to the Constitution
and to international law – by ratifying a treaty without first making certain that
portions of the treaty requiring domestic implementation can and will be
implemented. Failure to do so implicates the Take Care Clause and the
Supremacy Clause and violates the primary norm of international law: pacta sunt
servanda.289 The Senate similarly acts in bad faith when it consents to the
ratification of a treaty that requires domestic implementation and then does
nothing to implement the treaty.290

Conclusion: The Future of U.S. Foreign Affairs
Yoo and Irons both assume that the Constitution matters, but they don’t
tell us why or to what extent. The Constitution should matter. In areas where the
constitutional text is clear, we should presumptively follow the constitutional text.
The Declare War clause may not be a model of clarity. It was hastily composed
toward the end of the Constitutional Convention in response to objections raised
form the floor.291 John Yoo describes the clause as the product of an “obscure,
impairing popular sovereignty, reducing U.S. international power and limiting its domestic and
foreign policy options); John R. Bolton, U.S. Isn’t Legally Obligated to Pay the U.N., WALL ST. J.,
at A27 (Nov. 17, 1997) (arguing that the United States is not obligated to pay U.N. dues because
treaties are not law but merely political obligations).
288
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is our law and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).
289
See VIENNA CONV, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.”).
290
For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifies that
the parties to it are obligated to implement it. See INT’L COV. CIV. & POL. Rts, art. 2(2), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or
other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized
in the Covenant.”). The Senate, in granting its advice and consent to the treaty, specified that it
viewed the treaty as non-self-executing. See U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations to Its Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 139
CONG. REC. S4781, at III, (1) (Apr. 2, 1992) (declaring that the United States regards the
provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant non-self-executing). Because Congress has
never passed implementing legislation, plaintiffs have been unable to sustain causes of action
claiming violations of the ICCPR in U.S. courts. See, White v. Paulson, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387
(E.D. Wash. 1998) (concluding that the ICCPR does not give rise to a private right of action with
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garbled, last-minute debate.”292 However the enumeration of other war powers in
Article I, the Constitution’s structural limitations on executive power, the
statements of the Framers as to their understandings of the constitutional
allocation of war powers and the practice of the political branches in the Early
Republic all support the traditional view favoring congressional initiative in
matters relating to war and peace.
Increasingly since World War II and certainly since 9/11, Congress has
instead ceded its constitutional war powers to the executive.293 It seems unlikely
that any court will ever decide whether that abdication was lawful or whether
Congress can retrieve the powers that it ceded. The question is thus far more
likely to be decided through politics than law. As John Yoo acknowledges,
through its appropriations power, Congress has the power to rein in the executive
whenever it likes. 294 The real problem is not institutional competence but
institutional self-confidence.
Although the Constitution provides the starting point for any serious
discussion of the allocation of the foreign affairs power, ultimately the issue will
not be decided based on the original intentions of the Framers. As Irons
concludes with resignation, “only the collective voices and votes of the American
people can provide answers to the questions posed in this book: How and why do
we go to war?”295 But Breyer’s Hamdan concurrence, combined with the new
academic interest in popular constitutionalism, puts a more hopeful spin on Irons’
conclusion. The Framers expected that the country would work out constitutional
conflicts through democratic means. All three branches have constitutional
authority to interpret the constitutional allocation of the foreign affairs powers,
and the citizens of the United States must hold them accountable when they do so
in error.
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